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ABSTRACT 
 
Australia has shifted the way it conceives its international obligations under the 
Refugee Convention, calling into question its continuing viability as a protection 
instrument. The Refugee Convention was a progressive step towards the international 
recognition of human rights and justice. It invokes the key obligation of non-
refoulement, which prohibits State Parties from returning a vulnerable person to a 
place where their life or security is threatened. The Refugee Convention must 
contend with state sovereignty, which is the integral right of states to control the 
entry and residence of those within their territories. In the last few decades, the 
Refugee Convention has been confronted by a number of major challenges. In the 
current climate, the principle of state sovereignty is in competition with the 
humanitarian goal of protecting refugees. When faced with asylum seekers at their 
borders, many States have adopted restrictive practices in order to evade their 
protection obligations. This indicates a clear preference for sovereignty at the 
expense of human rights. While historically committed to the Refugee Convention, 
the governments of Australia have since implemented a range of measures to deter 
refugees from seeking asylum. Of these, the most contentious include prolonged 
mandatory detention and offshore processing. These policies are a blatant violation 
of Australia’s obligations under the Refugee Convention, especially with respect to 
non-refoulement. It is clear that the Refugee Convention is not being honoured in the 
way that it once was. It will be argued that despite contemporary issues, the Refugee 
Convention’s key principle of non-refoulement is the most significant obligation for 
protecting refugees and remains highly significant. 
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I     INTRODUCTION  
The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention)
1
 is the 
single most important international instrument for the protection of refugees. 
Established in 1951, the Refugee Convention was developed in a truly humanitarian 
spirit at a time where there was a genuine desire to help.
2
 The most fundamental 
obligation under the Refugee Convention is the principle of non-refoulement, which 
prohibits States from returning a vulnerable person to a place where they may face 
persecution.
3
 In acceding to the Refugee Convention, States also undertake to afford 
people the right to seek asylum
4
 and not to be penalised for doing so.
5
 Historically, 
Australia demonstrated a commitment and generosity towards the Refugee 
Convention, having been commended for resettling significant numbers of refugees 
from United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) recognised 
camps.
6
 However since the 1980’s, the Refugee Convention has faced a number of 
protection challenges. With the global number of people forced to flee their home 
country currently at 33.3 million,
7
 the continuing viability of the Refugee Convention 
has been called into question.  
Australia has experienced waves of asylum seekers arriving to its shores by boat. 
Given Australia’s geographical isolation and the state of international travel, 
Brennan proposes that Australia did not envisage that, when acceding to the 
obligations under the Refugee Convention, it would be confronted with asylum 
                                                        
1
 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 
UNTS 150 (entered into force 22 April 1954). 
2
 Ivor Jackson, ‘The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees: A Universal Basis 
for Protection’ (19901 3.1 International Journal of Refugee Law 403.  
3
 Refugee Convention art 33. 
4
 This right is grounded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), 
UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 183rd plen mtg, UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948) art 14. 
5
 Refugee Convention art 31. 
6
 See Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, ‘Refugee and 
Humanitarian Issues: Australia’s Response’, (Publication, June 2005); Graeme Hugo, ‘From 
compassion to compliance? Trends in refugee and humanitarian migration in Australia’ 
(2001) 55 GeoJournal. 
7
 Internal Displacement Monitoring Service, ‘Global Overview 2014: People internally 
displaced by conflict and violence’ (Draft Report, Norwegian Refugee Council, May 2014) 
<http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/library/Media/201405-globalOverview-
2014/7.-201405-global-overview-2014-en-embargoed.pdf>. 
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seekers at its borders.
8
 The governments from both major political parties have 
responded to each wave in an increasingly restrictive way, demonstrating a disregard 
for Australia’s international responsibilities.9 Australia’s asylum seeker policy has 
attracted considerable criticism for violating human rights, both under the Refugee 
Convention and other human rights treaties. Significantly, particular elements of 
Australia’s policy are clear violations of non-refoulement: the very heart of the 
Refugee Convention. The Australian Government has made it clear that state 
sovereignty has been preferred to the adherence to international obligations. As John 
Howard notoriously asserted: 
We have the right to decide who comes to this country, and the circumstances 
in which they come.
10
 
The courts have shown a tendency to be complacent in Parliament’s rejection of the 
obligations under the Refugee Convention. Until relatively recently, most High Court 
challenges to asylum seeker policies have been unsuccessful, showing a pattern of 
judicial acceptance. This research will provide a comprehensive overview of 
Australia’s asylum seeker policy and its consequent breaches of human rights. It will 
turn to examine why States are no longer willing to honour the Refugee Convention. 
Thus the object of this paper is:  
How has Australia shifted the way it conceives its international 
responsibilities under the Refugee Convention, and what does this mean for 
the future of the Refugee Convention?  
To address this aim, Part II will consider the strength of Australia’s past commitment 
to both migration and to the Refugee Convention. This will provide a contextual 
background to be contrasted with Australia’s current implementation of its 
obligations.  
Part III will firstly analyse the shifts in how the principles of the Refugee Convention 
have been implemented in domestic law and policy over time. To that end, several 
waves of arrivals will be identified, and the legislative response to each discussed. 
                                                        
8
 Frank Brennan, Tampering with Asylum: A Universal Humanitarian Problem, (University 
of Queensland Press, 2003) 16. 
9
 Ibid 10. 
10
 Prime Minister John Howard, ‘Election Speech’ (Speech delivered at Sydney NSW, 28 
October 2001) < http://electionspeeches.moadoph.gov.au/speeches/2001-john-howard>. 
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Part III will also consider the ways in which Australia’s asylum seeker policy has 
breached obligations under the Refugee Convention. It will be argued that Australia’s 
policies have serious implications for human rights under the Refugee Convention as 
well as other international human rights treaties. Secondly, the role of the courts in 
the interpretation and enforcement of Australia’s international obligations will also 
be considered. The corresponding case law will be analysed in order to highlight a 
pattern in jurisprudence. It will be asserted that with each wave of arrivals, 
Parliament has responded in a successively restrictive way, with the Courts typically 
accepting Parliament’s disregard for the Refugee Convention.  
Finally, Part IV will assess the shortfalls of the Refugee Convention and seek to 
determine whether it remains an effective instrument of protection. The major 
barriers to protection will be highlighted, and a conclusion will be made as to 
whether this renders the Refugee Convention unviable. While accepting that there are 
many significant barriers to providing protection under the Refugee Convention, it 
will be concluded that the obligations under the Refugee Convention, particularly 
non-refoulement are so fundamental for refugee protection that it cannot be 
abandoned.  
 
II     HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE REFUGEE 
CONVENTION AND AUSTRALIA’S EXPERIENCE 
A   Historical Context of the Refugee Convention 
In order to understand the rights, obligations and purpose of the Refugee Convention, 
it is valuable to first turn to the historical context in which it was developed. Prior to 
WWI, there was little concern with the movement of refugees. Groups of refugees on 
the move were relatively small and immigration was for the most part uncontrolled.
11
 
From 1914 to 1918, millions of people were forcibly displaced due to the war.
12
 At 
this time, the Western World began to experience a rise in political and economic 
                                                        
11
 James Hathaway, ‘The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law: 1920-1950’ 
(1984) 33.2 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 348. 
12
 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘The 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol’ (Publication, UNHCR, September 
2011) 1.  
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nationalism.
13
 While there was a strong concern for human suffering, there was also 
a concern among governments in the controlling of immigration and the movement 
of refugees.
14
 These factors triggered the international community to take action. 
Shortly after the war ended, several countries, including Australia, were involved in 
the founding of the League of Nations.
 
 The central objective of the League of 
Nations was keeping peace, but notably, it contained some provision for refugees.
15
 
This was the first attempt at regulating refugees in international law.
16
 However, 
definitions of a refugee were based on national origin, and whether to afford 
protection was a political decision.
17
 With the onset of WWII, it had become clear 
that the League of Nations could not fulfil its peacekeeping objective; support was 
gradually withdrawn and it was disbanded.  
The League of Nations was replaced by the United Nations, which officially came 
into existence on 24 October 1945. The WWII had caused millions of people in 
Europe to be forcibly displaced and deported.
18
 To assist with the resettlement of 
these people, the United Nations created the International Refugee Organisation 
(IRO) in 1946.
19
 The IRO was a temporary body, and was soon replaced by the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1952.
20
 The object of 
the UNHCR is to co-ordinate international refugee protection and to assist states in 
providing solutions for the refugee situation.
21
 Significantly, a short time later, the 
United Nations created the Refugee Convention, which entered into force on 22 April 
1954. The UNHCR now oversees the implementation of the Refugee Convention.  
                                                        
13
 Hathaway, ‘Evolution of Refugee Status’, Above n 11, 348. 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 United Nations, The League of Nations (1919-1946), (17 May 2014) United Nations 
Office at Geneva < 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006AC19C/(httpPages)/17C8E6BCE10E3F4F80256EF3003
7D733?OpenDocument>. 
16
 Jane McAdam, Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2007) 24.  
17
 Ibid 25.  
18
 UNHCR, ‘The Convention and its Protocol’, Above n 12, 1.  
19
 D Kennedy, ‘International Refugee Protection’ (1986) 8.1 Human Rights Quarterly 3. 
20
 The UNHCR was established under General Assembly resolution 428(v) on 14 December 
1950. 
21
 Guy Goodwin-Gill, ‘Introductory Note – Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees’ (18 October 2013) United Nations Audio Visual 
Library of International Law < http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/prsr/prsr.html>.  
 10 
The purpose of the Refugee Convention was to provide a way to deal with the 
displacement of Jews after WWII. There was reluctance among nations to take in 
these refugees.
22 
The Refugee Convention created an obligation to do so, as when a 
State Party becomes a signatory, they agree not to send vulnerable people back to 
persecution.
23 
This obligation to protect was limited in two ways: firstly it was 
geographically limited to Europe, and secondly it was temporally limited to people 
fleeing events that occurred before 1 January 1951.
24
 The scale of the refuge 
situation worldwide worsened. Recognising this, the United Nations responded in 
1967 by expanding the scope of the Refugee Convention, through the Optional 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Optional Protocol).
25
 The Optional 
Protocol removed the geographical and date limitations of the Refugee Convention, 
so that from then on, the Refugee Convention would apply universally.
26
 The Refugee 
Convention has since become the single most important international instrument for 
refugee protection, and has been used to protect and resettle tens of millions of 
refugees.
27
 Australia was one of the first countries to sign the Refugee Convention 
and thereafter has been commended for its participation in the resettlement program 
and financial contribution to the UNHCR.
28
 
B   Content of the Obligations under the Refugee Convention 
To assess Australia’s compliance with the obligations under the Refugee Convention, 
it is necessary to examine the rights and obligations set out for refugees and those 
conferred on asylum seekers.  A refugee, as amended by the Optional Protocol,
29
 is 
defined as: a person who has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
                                                        
22
 Azadeh Dastyari, ‘Explainer: Australia’s Obligations under the UN Refugee Convention’ 
(2013) The Monthly. 
23
 Brennan, Above n 8, 6.  
24
 Joan Fitzpatrick, ‘Revitalizing the 1951 Refugee Convention’ (1996) 9 Harvard Human 
Rights Journal 232. 
25
 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, GA Res 2198 (XXI), UN GAOR, A/Res/2198, 
1495
th
 plen mtg, (16 December 1966, entered into force 4 October 1967) (Optional 
Protocol). 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Flowing Across Borders 
(29 April 2014) UNHCR- The UN Refugee Agency 
<http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c125.html>. 
28
 See Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, ‘Australia’s 
Response: 2005’ Above n 6; Hugo, Above n 6.  
29
 Optional Protocol. 
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opinion, whom is outside the country of their nationality, and whom is be unable or 
unwilling to return to that country due to the fear of being persecuted.
30
 The Refugee 
Convention does not extend to persons for whom there is a serious reason for 
believing they have committed particular crimes, for example: war crimes; those who 
benefit under another United Nations agency; or those who have a status equivalent 
to nationals in the country of asylum.
31
   
For people who are recognised as refugees, the Refugee Convention specifies several 
basic legal rights and protections to which they are entitled. Every person who has 
been recognised as a refugee was initially an asylum seeker. Therefore, State Parties 
must treat asylum seekers on the assumption that they may be refugees. The most 
important obligations under the Refugee Convention are the right to seek asylum, the 
principle of non-refoulement, non-penalisation and non-discrimination. 
1   The Right to Seek Asylum 
The right to seek asylum is at the heart of the Refugee Convention. It is a legal right 
available to all human beings.
 
This right is grounded in Article 14 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights,
 32
 which stipulates that everyone has the right to seek 
and to enjoy protection from persecution. It is important to note that refugees are not 
committing a crime by seeking asylum, as it is a legal right under international law.
33
 
Therefore, the unauthorised entry into a country must not be considered illegal where 
the person is seeking asylum. In addition to the right to seek asylum, the Refugee 
Convention obliges governments to ensure that people can make an application for 
asylum and have their status determined.  
2   Non-refoulement 
The most significant of the obligations under the Refugee Convention is the principle 
of non-refoulement. It is the cornerstone of refugee protection. Non-refoulement is an 
prohibition on States not to expel or return a refugee, by any means, to the place in 
which his ‘life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, 
                                                        
30
 Refugee Convention art 1A(2).  
31
 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Introductory Note by the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)’ (Introductory 
Note, UNHCR, December 2010) 4.  
32
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 183rd 
plen mtg, UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948). 
33
 Ibid 14. 
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nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion’.34 This 
principle applies to all human beings, whether they have been recognised as refugees 
or remain classified as asylum seekers.
 
It is arguably the most important principle 
under the Refugee Convention for the protection of asylum seekers.
35
 State parties 
are unable to make reservations to this principle.
36
 The principle of non-refoulement 
is of such importance that it has gained the status of jus cogens under international 
law.
37
 In effect, this means that the non-refoulement principle is technically binding 
on all States, where they are signatories to the Refugee Convention or otherwise. 
However, Article 33 is limited in that there are circumstances where state 
sovereignty prevails over the obligation: States are permitted to refoul a person 
where that person is a security risk or has been convicted of certain criminal 
offences.
38
  
3   Non-penalisation 
The principle of non-penalisation is another fundamental protection for asylum 
seekers. It is contained under Article 31 of the Refugee Convention, and provides that 
States shall not impose penalties on refugees for their illegal entry or presence in the 
State’s territory. This principle prohibits states from penalising asylum seekers for 
committing immigration offences and criminal offences, and provides that asylum 
seekers cannot be arbitrarily detained on account of seeking asylum.
39
 This applies to 
asylum seekers who arrive both by regular means and irregular means. To comply 
with this principle, Australia must ensure that asylum seekers are not arbitrarily 
detained on account of their seeking asylum. This calls into question Australia’s 
policy of the mandatory detention of all irregular arrivals, which will be explored in 
detail below.  
                                                        
34
 Refugee Convention art 33. 
35
 Fitzpatrick, Above n 24, 237. 
36
 Optional Protocol art VII(1). 
37
 As affirmed in the United Nations Declaration of State Parties to the 1951 Convention 
and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted at the Ministerial 
Meeting of State Parties of 12-13 December 2001, HCR/MMSP/2001/09, 16 January 2002. 
See, eg, UNHCR, ‘The Convention and its Protocol’, Above n 12, 5. See also Jean Allain, 
‘The jus cogens Nature of Non-refoulement’ (2001) 12 International Journal of Refugee 
Law 533. 
38
 Guy Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law (Oxford Claredon Press, 2
nd
 ed, 
1996) 120. 
39
 UNHCR, ‘Introductory Note’, Above n 31, 3.  
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4   Non-Discrimination 
Another significant principle required by the Refugee Convention is that of non-
discrimination, as provided for under Article 3. It stipulates that States must not 
discriminate between refugees on account of their race, religion or country of origin 
when applying the principles of the Refugee Convention. Further to these grounds, 
international law has prohibited discrimination on additional grounds of sex, age, 
disability or sexuality.
40 
State Parties are not permitted to make reservations to 
Article 3. Certain policies of Australia may have compromised the principle of non-
discrimination between asylum seekers, for example the 2010 decision to suspend 
processing the claims of asylum seekers from Sri Lanka for 3 months and those from 
Afghanistan for 6 months.
41
 
Once recognised as a refugee, states are obliged to afford to refugees a range of civil, 
political, social and cultural rights and freedoms. Some important rights include the 
right to work,
42
 the right to housing,
43
 the right to education,
44
 the right to public 
relief and assistance,
45
 the right to freedom of religion,
46
 the right to access the 
courts,
47
 the right to freedom of movement within the territory,
48
 and the right to be 
issued identity and travel documents.
49
 These rights only extend to a person once 
they have been officially recognised as a refugee, and do not apply to asylum 
seekers.  
It is important to note that the obligations under the Refugee Convention do not stand 
alone; they are to compliment international obligations under various other human 
rights treaties. Australia is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR),
50
 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
                                                        
40
 Ibid. 
41
 Chris Bowen, Minister for Immigration and Citizenship with Stephen Smith MP, Minister 
for Foreign Affairs and Brendan O’Connor MP, Minister for Home Affairs, ‘Changes to 
Australian Immigration Processing System’, (Joint Media Release, 9 April 2010). 
42
 Refugee Convention arts 17-19. 
43
 Ibid art 21. 
44
 Ibid art 22. 
45
 Ibid art 23. 
46
 Ibid art 4. 
47
 Ibid art 16. 
48
 Ibid art 26. 
49
 Ibid arts 27-28. 
50
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 
1966, 999 UNTS 171 and 1057 UNTS 407 (entered into force 23 March 1976). 
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Cultural Rights,
51
 the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention Against Torture),
52
 and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.
53
 The Refugee Convention is supported and 
reinforced by these human rights treaties.
54
  
C    Australia’s Historical Commitment  
1    Commitment to the Refugee Convention 
In order to assess how Australia has changed the way it conceived its obligations 
under the Refugee Convention, it is important to explore Australia’s historical 
commitment to the Refugee Convention. There are several factors that indicate that 
Australia was historically highly committed to the Refugee Convention. Australia 
was among the first state parties to accede to the Refugee Convention, signing the 
treaty when it came into force on 22 January 1954.
55 
Australia was a keen participant 
in the drafting of the Refugee Convention.
56
 Participating in drafting is not in itself a 
positive commitment to human rights. For example, Australia’s participation in the 
drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was not entirely conducive to 
refugee protection. As Brennan outlines, Australia was strongly opposed to the 
inclusion of the right to be granted asylum.
57 
Although in hindsight, it is clear that a 
right to be granted asylum would most likely cause a range of social, economic and 
political problems, given the number of people seeking asylum. In 1973, Australia 
committed to the Optional Protocol, submitting to the much broader application of 
the Refugee Convention. However, given Australia’s geographical isolation and the 
state of international travel, Brennan proposes that Australia may not have perceived 
that it would ever be confronted with asylum seekers on its shores.
58 
 
                                                        
51
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 
December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 November 1976) (ICESCR). 
52
 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, opened for signature 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 
June 1987). 
53
 Convention on Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 
(entered into force 2 September 1990). 
54
 Alperhan Babacan, ‘Citizenship Rights in a Global Era: The Adequacy of International 
Human Rights Law in Providing Protection to Asylum Seekers (2007) 3.9 Review of 
International Law and Politics 161. 
55
 Hugo, Above n 6.  
56
 Brennan, Above n 8, 15. 
57
 Ibid 2. 
58
 Ibid 16. 
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2    Commitment to the UNHCR 
Australia has been commended for its role in various aspects of the UNHCR.  As a 
member of several United Nations advisory bodies,
59
 Australia has made a 
contribution to the development of international policy.
60 
Reflecting its commitment 
to the Refugee Convention, Australia has made significant financial contributions to 
the UNHCR on a regular basis. Australia has been commended for its ongoing 
commitment in this area.
61 
This important contribution can be exemplified by the 
current pledge by the government of $93 million core funding to the UNHCR, over 
the period of 2013-2016.
62 
  
One of the most important demonstrations of Australia’s commitment to the Refugee 
Convention is the offshore component of the ‘Humanitarian Programme’. Under the 
offshore component, Australia resettles UNHCR recognised refugees, who typically 
have fled their home country and are waiting in overseas camps for resettlement. 
Australia is one of only 10 countries to regularly resettle refugees in this way.
63
 
Participation in the resettlement program is not obligatory, and goes beyond 
Australia’s obligations under the Refugee Convention.64  
D    Australia’s Attitude towards Migration and Refugees 
1    Australia’s experience with Migration 
To gain an understanding of the current treatment of asylum seekers and refugees, it 
is interesting to examine Australia’s attitude historically towards both refugees and 
migrants in general. Australia has been built on migration,
65
 having encouraged and 
at times assisted people in migrating to Australia. Prior to Federation until WWI, 
                                                        
59
 For example Australia is a member of the UN Advisory Committee on Refugees and the 
UN Refugee Fund Executive Committee, which is now the UNHCR Executive Committee. 
60
 Department of Immigration and Citizenship (Cth), ‘Refugee and Humanitarian Issues: 
Australia’s Response’ (Booklet, Australian Government, June 2009) 14. 
61
 Hugo, Above n 6.  
62
 Australian Government and the UNHCR, ‘Partnership Framework Between Australian 
Agency for International Development and the Department of Immigration and Citizenship 
on behalf of the Commonwealth of Australia (hereafter known as ‘the Australian 
Government’ and The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(hereafter referred to as “UNHCR”) 2013-2016’, (Partnership Agreement No 64576, 21 
September 2012).  
63
 Brennan, Above n 8, 10. 
64
 Department of Immigration and Citizenship, ‘Australia’s Response: 2009’, Above n 60, 
16. 
65
 Brennan, Above n 8, 1. 
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Australia had various migration schemes in place to encourage young, skilled British 
and other Europeans to relocate to Australia by offering incentives such as passage 
assistance and land grants.
66
 These programs were fuelled by Australia’s need to 
build the economy, increase the population and strengthen its national defence.
67
 
However, from the outset the law and policy in Australia was selective and 
exclusive. This stemmed from the economic conflict between the Chinese population 
living in Australia and the European migrants in 1857.
68
 The conflict escalated to 
riots, and, as lawmakers perceived the Chinese as a threat to the economy and 
culture, they sought to exclude them.   
One of the first laws passed after Federation was the Immigration Restriction Act 
1901 (Cth), which prevented all non-Europeans from permanent entry.
69
 This act 
gave rise to the White Australia policy, as it allowed the government to select 
migrants on the basis of their race, work and skills.
70
 Under the act, prospective 
immigrants were made to undergo a Dictation Test in any prescribed European 
language.
71
 Officials were said to have purposefully manipulated the test to ensure 
undesirable applicants failed.
72
 According to Crock, Saul and Dastyari, the aim of 
this Act was to protect Australia from ‘threats’ of invasion from other non-British 
and non-European cultures, and particularly from Asian migrants.
73
   
The White Australia policy was abolished in 1973, but it had embedded a racist tone 
to immigration. The Eastern European migrants, who were once welcomed, arriving 
after WWII were treated with some hostility.
74
 Similar attitudes were also evident in 
1996, with the rise of Pauline Hanson and the One Nation Party. The racist sentiment 
originating in the White Australia policy is an expression of the insecurity of 
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Australia and its fear of the ‘other’.75 Australians perceive that migrants and refugees 
pose a threat to the economy, society and culture.
76
 This insecurity has manifested in 
the treatment of the Vietnamese asylum seekers in 1976, the Cambodians in 1989, 
the Afghans and Iraqis in 1999 and again in 2011, and finally the asylum seeker 
policy of today.  
2    Australia’s Experience with Refugees prior to 1976 
Australia has been generally welcoming of European refugees. Some of the first 
refugees to be accepted by Australia were the Jewish refugees fleeing Hitler’s 
regime. At the Evian Conference in 1938, Australia agreed to accept 15,000 Jewish 
refugees over a three-year period.
77
 It has been argued that Australia provided 
assistance to these refugees, not for the humanitarian reason of providing protection, 
but for Australia to grow the nation’s economy. This is so because Australia 
handpicked the refugees who would be accepted, choosing young, skilled workers, 
and avoiding the uneducated or those unable to work.
78
 This arrangement however 
ceased after a short time due to the war. Another large intake of refugees began in 
1956, when Australia accepted 14,000 Hungarian refugees after the anti-Communist 
uprising, and in 1968 allowed around 6,000 refugees from Czechoslovakia to settle 
in Australia.
79
 These large intakes of refugees demonstrated that Australia was 
typically willing to accept particular refugees from European countries.  
Australia has had a different experience with the movement and asylum of non-
Europeans, as it appears that the White Australia policy continued to influence the 
refugee experience. In 1939, Australia admitted over 6,000 non-Europeans who were 
fleeing the Pacific War. Although the majority were voluntarily repatriated after the 
war, the government passed legislation to forcibly remove those who did not agree to 
return home.
80
 It was clear that Australia was not interested in offering permanent 
protection.  
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E    First Wave of Asylum Seekers 
A very significant event occurred on 27 April 1976. A 17 metre fishing boat arrived 
in Darwin, carrying five Indochinese men who were seeking protection in 
Australia.
81
 This marked the beginning of the first wave of boat arrivals.  From 1976 
to 1981, some 2,059 people arrived by boat seeking protection.
82
 These asylum 
seekers were mostly Vietnamese who were fleeing the fall of Saigon and the perils of 
the communist government takeover.
83
 Some of the asylum seekers feared being 
persecuted by the communist government as they had either worked for the South 
Vietnamese Government or assisted the Western Forces.
84
 Adding to the turmoil in 
South East Asia, the Khmer Rouge incited conflict in Cambodia in 1979.
85
 Because 
of this, more asylum seekers began fleeing to Australia.  
As this was the first experience with asylum seekers arriving to Australia, there were 
no policy or procedures in place for handling claims of asylum.
 86 
Instead, the asylum 
seekers were processed as migrants through the standard migration stream. The 
administrative decision to grant protection was therefore left to the discretion of the 
Minister. Shortly after the first arrivals in 1980, the Government amended the 
Migration Act to provide a legal basis for the Minister’s discretion. The Immigration 
(Unauthorised Arrivals) Act 1980 (Cth) provided Commonwealth Officials with the 
power to arrest an unauthorised arrival and take them to a ‘prescribed authority’ who 
could order their detention.
87
 If the Minister was satisfied that the person was a 
refugee, the Minister could grant the person an entry permit, as contained under 
section 6A(1)(c) of the Migration Act. If not found to be a refugee, the person could 
be deported.
88
 
All of the asylum seekers who arrived from 1976 to 1981 were found to be refugees 
and were granted permanent residency.
89
 Manne suggests that the Fraser 
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Government’s decision to grant protection may have been influenced by Australia’s 
involvement as a combatant in the Vietnam War, and as such, Australia felt a moral 
responsibility to help.
90
  For whatever reason, the Australian Government showed a 
certain generosity towards these refugees. The Australian Government was also 
mindful of the large number of Vietnamese who required assistance but who 
remained in Vietnam or neighbouring countries. In 1975 Australia accepted a total of 
748 Vietnamese refugees from offshore settlement camps.
91
  
However, there was a complete lack of policy for the resettlement of these offshore 
refugees. Some of the refugees were brought to Australia under the normal 
immigration scheme,
 92
 and were not assisted in any way.
93
 Others were assisted only 
for the first two weeks;
94
 hence they found considerable difficulty in integrating into 
the community. The Senate’s Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence 
recommended the urgent need for Australia to develop policy for refugee settlement 
that took into account the special needs of the refugees.
95
 While there was a lack of 
policy and a failure to provide settlement services for this wave of refugees, the 
procedures put into place for the arrival of the first wave of arrivals were in 
accordance with Australia’s human rights obligations.96 The response to the 
subsequent waves of arrivals was much more restrictive and presented a challenge to 
Australia’s sovereignty.  
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III     THE SHIFT FROM REFUGEE PROTECTION TO 
IMMIGRATION CONTROL 
A    Balancing Refugee Protection with State Sovereignty 
Because States are prohibited from refouling refugees who are in their territories, the 
Refugee Convention conflicts with notions of state sovereignty. One of the 
fundamental principles of the United Nations is the recognition of state sovereignty, 
which is contained under Article 2(1) in the Charter of the United Nations.  This 
principle provides that each member state is independent and is free to conduct its 
affairs without interference.
97
 An important element of sovereignty in international 
law is the right of states to control the entry, residence and expulsion of people in 
their territory.
98
 Indeed the right to control migration is legitimate and vitally 
important to self-preservation. There are many social, economic and political 
problems associated with untrammelled migration.
99
 Seglow highlights that some of 
the ‘dangers’ of overpopulation are social disorder, crime and terrorism, threats to 
cultural homogeneity, job losses and wage depression for the working population.
100
 
In Australia, the right to control migration is derived from the Constitution of 
Australia,
101
 which provides the legal foundation for the Migration Act.  Therefore 
Australia has the right to control migration and restrict entry however it decides, free 
from interference. 
International human rights law can operate to restrict state sovereignty.
102
 Hathaway 
provides that state sovereignty can be restricted by way of treaties imposing 
standards of conduct, and through international customary law, to which State Parties 
must adhere.
103
 Since Australia is a party to various human rights treaties, Australia 
is obliged by international law to ensure that people are able to enjoy their human 
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rights and must avoid taking any action that may cause a breach of human rights.
104
 
A consequence of acceding to the Refugee Convention is that Australia does not have 
absolute control over who may enter its territory.
105
 This is because the Refugee 
Convention provides the right to all people to enter and seek asylum without being 
penalised or refouled.
106
  
The Refugee Convention does little to limit a preference for sovereignty. As the 
Refugee Convention does not prescribe an approach, States must decide how they 
will reconcile principles of state sovereignty with the obligations imposed by the 
Refugee Convention. Goodwin-Gill highlights that this causes a struggle between 
competing interests: the humanitarian interest in providing protection under the 
Refugee Convention and the national interest in maintaining state sovereignty and 
self-preservation.
107
 As understood by Hathaway, States including Australia have 
become less concerned with human rights violations and more focused on border 
security and migration control.
108
 Rightly or wrongly, national interests have 
prevailed, to a point where many states have read down the humanitarian obligations 
and restricted the ways they provide protection.  
While Australia had been content with accepting those who could be selected on the 
basis of race, ethnic origin and skills,
109
 it had little experience with the uninvited. 
When waves of asylum seekers began arriving to Australia’s shores, it was perceived 
to be a loss of state control and a challenge to sovereignty, borders and security.
110
 
With each wave of irregular arrivals, governments from both major political parties 
have responded with a more restrictive policy,
111
 consistently favouring sovereignty 
over human rights.  
B    Second Wave: Cambodians between 1989 - 1992 
Starting to draw away from the generosity shown to the first wave of asylum seekers, 
the Government’s response to the second wave was handled with more resistance. 
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This wave of asylum seekers arrived between 1989 and 1992.
112
 The asylum seekers 
were Cambodians fleeing the ongoing conflict and violence incited by the Khmer 
Rouge regime.
113
 It was estimated that 1.7 million people were killed due to violence 
or died due to famine.
114
 Australia was less welcoming of the Cambodian asylum 
seekers, labelling them ‘economic migrants’, ‘queue jumpers’ and ‘forum 
shoppers’.115 This wave of arrivals triggered the Government to establish the policy 
of indefinite mandatory detention, which has been criticised widely for constituting 
arbitrary detention.
116
 Worsening the position of asylum seekers, the courts were 
reluctant to acknowledge any obligations under the Refugee Convention. 
There had been a provision in Australia’s immigration policy since Federation that 
allowed for detention.
117
 The Government triggered this power in 1989 by way of the 
Migration Legislation Amendment Act 1989 (Cth). The amending act introduced a 
system of mandatory detention.
118
 Asylum seekers, being those who arrived in 
Australia without a visa or entry permit, were classed as ‘prohibited entrants’.119 The 
amending act provided that ‘prohibited entrants’ could be detained until they were 
either granted an entry permit or removed from Australia on the vessel they arrived 
on.
120
  
In practice, asylum seekers were detained under this provision for periods exceeding 
four years.
121
 For the purposes of the Migration Act, a person detained under this 
provision was considered not to have entered Australia. This meant that irregular 
arrivals were detained and denied the procedural safeguards that were afforded to 
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non-citizens whose visa had expired, but then claimed protection.
122
 This provision 
was intended to apply to the small amount of stowaways arriving and those whose 
entry permit had expired. However, it soon became the basis of detaining all boat 
arrivals.
123
  
1    Testing the detention of asylum seekers  
The case of Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration Local Government & Ethnic 
Affairs (Chu Kheng Lim)
124
 involved two groups of Cambodian asylum seekers, who 
arrived on 27 November 1989 and 31 March 1990. The asylum seekers claimed 
refugee status and were detained under the newly implemented section 88 of the 
Migration Act. They were subsequently denied protection. These asylum seekers 
sought to challenge the Minister’s decision in the Federal Court, as allowable under 
section 15 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1997 (Cth). The 
applicants were to argue that their detention was unlawful, as it had no legal 
foundation. Before the case was heard, the Minister vacated his decisions and 
forwarded the case to be reassessed.  
The applicants appealed to the High Court on the grounds that the Minister was 
exceeding his power in detaining the applicants under section 88, and owed the 
applicants a duty under the Refugee Convention and the ICCPR. They sought an 
injunction and a declaration against the Minister and the Commonwealth of 
Australia. The Government strongly contested this case.
125
 
Two days before the hearing in the High Court, on May 5, Parliament rushed through 
the Migration Amendment Act 1992 (Cth) (May 5 Amendments). The effect of this 
legislation was to retrospectively provide a legal basis for the detention of the 
applicants. This act inserted provisions into the Migration Act to be the basis of the 
detention of irregular arrivals.
126
 Under the new provisions, a ‘designated person’ 
was required to be detained and could remain in detention for a period of up to 273 
days.
127
 Under section 54P, the detainee could seek the Minister’s permission to be 
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released and removed from Australia.
128
 Importantly, under section 54R, ‘a court is 
not to order the release from custody of a designated person’. This was the beginning 
of Parliament’s attempt to reduce the role of the courts in reviewing asylum seeker 
decisions.  
The High Court agreed that the initial detention of the applicants was unlawful.
129
 
However, the majority found in favour of the Commonwealth, concluding that the 
May 5 Amendments provided the legal basis for the applicant’s detention, and thus 
immigration detention was lawful.
130
 Had it not been for the May 5 Amendments, 
section 88 would not have provided a legal basis for the detention.
131
 
The applicant’s lawyers commenced a claim for compensation for the unlawful 
imprisonment prior to 5 May 1992.
132
 The Keating Government moved swiftly to 
amend the Migration Act by way of the Migration Reform Act 1992 (Cth) (1992 
Reforms), which extinguished the right of the Cambodians to compensation and 
limited any other compensation to $1 per day of detention. The result for the asylum 
seekers in Chu Kheng Lim was that they, provided they agreed to return home for 12 
months, were permitted to migrate to Australia.
133
  
(a)    Implications of the Chu Kheng Lim Decision 
The decision of the High Court in this case was fundamental in forming the 
boundaries of Australia’s immigration policy. Under the Constitution, Parliament has 
the power to make laws with respect to ‘aliens’.134 So as to link the May 5 
Amendments to the ‘aliens’ power, the majority focused on the term ‘non-citizens’, 
which was used throughout the legislation. The High Court confirmed that the 
‘aliens’ power enabled Parliament to legislate with respect to non-citizens 
concerning almost anything,
135
 thus the detention of non-citizens was found to be 
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constitutionally valid. The detention would have been unlawful had the applicants 
been Australian citizens.
136
  
Another influential point in this decision was the consideration of whether section 
54R, excluding the courts from ordering the release of a person in all circumstances, 
was constitutionally valid. According to the Constitution, judicial power is 
exclusively vested in the courts.
137
 The High Court considered whether Parliament 
could legislate for the detention of a person without a court order. The majority 
found that section 54R, seeking to excluding the courts, was usurpation on judicial 
power as it sought to completely exclude the judicial review of detention.
138
 In 
leading judgment it was stated: 
A law of the Parliament which purports to direct, in unqualified terms, that no 
court, including this Court, shall order the release from custody of a person 
whom the Executive of the Commonwealth has imprisoned purports to 
derogate from that direct vesting of judicial power and to remove ultra vires 
acts of the Executive from the control of this Court. Such a law manifestly 
exceeds the legislative powers of the Commonwealth and is invalid.
139
  
Dissenting, Mason CJ, Toohey and McHugh JJ interpreted the relevant sections in 
such a way as to allow the courts to review detention where the detention is punitive 
and not lawful.
140
 The dissenting judges referred to the fact that a detainee could 
request to be released and removed from Australia under s 54P(1), and concluded 
that the detention was voluntary, and not punitive.
141
 
The reasoning of the High Court demonstrated a disregard for any obligations under 
the Refugee Convention. The High Court did not acknowledge the possibility that the 
applicants were refugees under the Refugee Convention.
142
 Furthermore, the High 
Court failed to consider that allowing a detainee to request to be removed from 
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Australia under section 54P could constitute refoulement.
143
 Crock argues that this 
judgment did not contemplate principles of international law, especially in relation to 
arbitrary detention.
144
  For example, the High Court failed to determine the legality 
of: continued detention for long periods of time, continued detention where the 
processing of claims had been suspended and whether the conditions of detention 
were unconstitutional.
145
 Effectively, the decision in Chu Kheng Lim permitted a 
system of immigration detention that was mandatory and not judicially 
reviewable.
146
 It also signified the shift of the system from focusing on refugee 
protection to immigration control.
147
  
2    The Shift to Indefinite Mandatory Detention 
Very importantly the 1992 Reforms, which came into force on 1 September 1994, 
made the detention of unlawful citizens mandatory and indefinite. Section 189 
provides that a Commonwealth Officer must detain a person within the ‘migration 
zone’ if they know or reasonably suspect them to be an unlawful non-citizen. 
Detention was also mandatory for a person who could not provide documentation 
proving them to be a lawful non-citizen.
148
 The 1992 Reforms removed the 273-day 
limit to detention, making immigration detention indefinite. In a series of cases 
handed down in 2004, the High Court upheld the validity of mandatory detention, 
even where detention was indefinite.
149
 
As the High Court had cast doubt on section 54R, Parliament sought to narrow the 
grounds for the courts involvement. The 1992 Reforms inserted section 196(3) into 
the Migration Act, which prohibited courts from ordering the release of a detainee, 
other than for the purposes of their removal, deportation or where they are granted a 
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visa. Furthermore, the grounds under which the courts could review a decision were 
limited. The failure to observe the requirements of natural justice, for the most part, 
was no longer a ground for review.
150
 The 1992 Reforms codified the statutory 
requirements for natural justice to be met and established the Refugee Review 
Tribunal who would review administrative decisions. This was an attempt to override 
procedural fairness under common law.
151
 This was a likely response to a series of 
cases in which the courts ruled, contrary to earlier cases,
152
 that where the Minister 
failed to afford natural justice in deportation decisions, the decision is invalid.
153
 
However, following this amendment, the Federal Courts continued to review cases 
according to common law principles of natural justice.
154
 
3    Human Rights Implications of Mandatory Detention  
Since 1992, Australia’s mandatory detention policy has remained a core mechanism 
of Australia’s asylum seeker policy and has been relatively unchanged under both 
major political parties. From the outset, the use of detention has been criticised 
widely.
155
 The Refugee Convention recognises that States have the capacity to detain 
non-citizens pending decisions about their status.
156
 According to the Refugee 
Convention, the detention of asylum seekers is permitted only where necessary.
157
 
Article 9 allows States to take provisional measures while making a determination of 
refugee status if it is ‘essential to the national security in the case of a particular 
person’ and ‘necessary in his case in the interests of national security’.158 Further, 
article 31(2) allows States to restrict the movement of refugees while their status is 
being determined but again, the restrictions must be necessary. 
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The most fundamental rights that can be violated by immigration detention are the 
right to liberty and the right to be free from arbitrary detention. These rights are 
contained in the ICCPR,
159
 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
160
 Article 
10 provides that anyone who is detained should be entitled to proceedings before a 
court to determine the lawfulness of the detention.
161
 The ICCPR further provides 
that detainees should be treated with humanity and respect for the dignity of the 
person.
162
 Where the conditions of detention are poor, the rights to be free from 
torture and cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment can become 
relevant.
163
 
Additional obligations arise with respect to the detention of children. The Convention 
on the Rights of the Child prescribes a similar right for children to be free from any 
unlawful or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. Article 37(b) commands that detention 
should be used as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period.
164
 
For decisions relating to children, the best interests of the child should be a primary 
consideration.
165
 States must take appropriate measures to ensure that asylum seeker 
children receive appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance in the enjoyment 
of the rights under all treaties that State is a party to.
166
 Detention is undesirable for 
children, especially unaccompanied children, and other vulnerable groups including 
single women and those with medical or psychological needs.
167
 As at 31 March 
2014, there were 895 children in immigration detention facilities.
168
  
It is clear that Australia’s mandatory detention policy does not meet standards of 
international law.
169
 Australia’s system of detention is beyond what is permissible; it 
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is arbitrary.
170
 Arbitrary detention typically refers to detention that is unlawful, but 
also extends to detention that is inappropriate, unjust and unpredictable.
171
 For the 
detention to be acceptable, it must be reasonable and necessary in the 
circumstances.
172
 Immigration detention should be a measure of last resort.
173
 There 
are three features of Australia’s immigration detention system that are symptomatic 
of the arbitrary nature of that detention.  
Firstly, under the Migration Act, detention is mandatory.
174
 According to the 
UNHCR, detention must be necessary, reasonable in all the circumstances and 
proportionate to a legitimate purpose.
175
 Each case must be individually assessed in 
order to determine whether the detention is reasonable.
176
 Because asylum seekers 
are detained by operation of law, there is no avenue for consideration of the special 
circumstances of each person, which is arbitrary.
 177
 This has led to many vulnerable 
groups being detained, such as children, the elderly and people with medical 
impairments.
178
  
Secondly, immigration detention under the Migration Act is indefinite and there is no 
maximum time limit on detention.
 179
 The UNHCR recommends that domestic law 
should impose maximum periods of detention to protect against arbitrariness.
180
 
Immigration detention in Australia is usually lengthy, rendering it disproportionate to 
its purpose and making it arbitrary.
181
 For asylum seekers, the uncertainty brought by 
spending an indefinite time in detention centres has affected their physical and 
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mental health.
182
 Prolonged detention can therefore amount to cruel, inhumane or 
degrading treatment, thus breaching Australia’s international obligations.183 
Prolonged detention can also be a breach of the right to be treated humanely and with 
dignity while in detention,
184
 the right to the highest standard of health attainable, the 
right to education and the right to participate in cultural life.
185
  
Thirdly, according to international law, the decision to detain a person must be 
reviewable by the Courts.
186
 However, under the ‘privative clause’ section of the 
Migration Act, many of the decisions involving asylum seekers were prohibited from 
being reviewed.
187
 The UN Human Rights Committee has found the exclusion of the 
courts constitutes a breach of the right to be free from arbitrary detention.
188
 
However, as a result of the decision in Plaintiff S157, the privative clause was 
rendered ineffective and the courts have maintained the jurisdiction to review 
decisions as fundamental rights are at stake. This significant decision will be further 
discussed below. 
The UNHCR has also provided that immigration detention must serve a legitimate 
purpose.
189
 There are four grounds for which an asylum seeker can be detained: (i) to 
verify a person’s identity; (ii) to determine the elements of a claim; (iii) to deal with 
cases of missing or fraudulent identity documents and (iv) to protect national security 
or public order.
190
 The purpose of the detention cannot be to serve as a penalty,
191
 or 
to deter others from seeking asylum. It is clear that Australia’s mandatory detention 
policy is intended to be a deterrent. 
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There have been successive calls to end Australia’s system of indefinite mandatory 
detention by the UNHCR, the UN Human Rights Committee,
192
 Committee on the 
Rights of the Child, Committee Against Torture
193
 and the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. In addition, many government and 
non-government organisations
194
 have conducted inquiries. The Australian Human 
Rights Commission has long been critical of Australia’s detention system. In a report 
in 1998, the Commission concluded that Australia’s system of mandatory detention 
was arbitrary.
195
 Later in 2004 the Commission found that the detention of children 
was ‘fundamentally inconsistent’ with Australia’s obligations under the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child.
196
 Australia’s policy of mandatory immigration detention 
is blatantly arbitrary.
197 
 Despite this it has remained a fundamental, politically 
uncontested element of asylum seeker policy over the last few decades. This 
demonstrates that state sovereignty and border control have prevailed over refugee 
protection and human rights. 
C    Third Wave: The Tampa Affair: 1999 - 2001 
While the Cambodian asylum seekers were met with some disdain, this was only to 
grow worse for the following wave of asylum seekers. This third wave of arrivals 
triggered the establishment of the Pacific Solution under which asylum seekers were 
sent to detention centres in countries with little refugee protection framework. Again 
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the courts were reluctant to consider the obligations under the Refugee Convention. 
The asylum seekers of this wave, arriving between 1999 and 2001, were 
predominately from the Middle East, the majority from Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Sri 
Lanka and Pakistan.
198
 Many were Iraqi, fleeing the perils of Saddam Hussein’s 
dictatorship. Other asylum seekers were Afghans who were escaping the Taliban 
takeover of Kabul.
199
 The Taliban, being Sunni Muslims, had targeted the Hazara 
ethnics, who were Shia Muslims. The Taliban persecuted the Hazaras by committing 
massacre campaigns against civilians, suicide bombings and widespread violence 
and rape of women.
200
 The majority of the 12,000 arrivals from the Middle East were 
recognised as refugees.
201
 However, they were less than welcomed by Australia.  
A major change to Australia’s asylum seeker policy was sparked in 2001 by what 
became known as the Tampa Affair. On 26 August a small boat carrying 433 asylum 
seekers began to sink on route to Australia. Australian Coastal Watch requested that 
a Norwegian cargo ship, called the MV Tampa, assist the vessel and take the asylum 
seekers to Indonesia. The Captain was reluctant, as there were 460 persons on board 
and only 40 lifejackets.
202
 The Captain sought permission to enter Australian waters. 
Allowing the asylum seekers to disembark on Christmas Island would trigger the 
rights under the Migration Act, and Australia would then be obliged to process and 
determine the asylum seekers’ claims for protection. Due to the spike in asylum 
seeker arrivals, the Government wanted to send a message that Australia would take 
a hard line with respect to boat arrivals. Australian authorities refused to allow the 
Tampa to enter its waters, and a three-day standoff ensued.  
Since four passengers were unconscious and there was a shortage of food and water, 
the Captain issued a distress signal and entered Australia’s territorial waters. To 
prevent any asylum seekers from disembarking the ship and claiming protection, 
Australian SAS troops boarded and took control of the ship, planning to remove it 
from Australia’s territory.203 The Government attempted to push the Border 
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Protection Bill 2001 through Parliament, which would retrospectively validate their 
actions. The Senate rejected the Bill.  
1    VCCL v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs
204
 
On behalf of the asylum seekers on board the Tampa, Eric Vadarlis and the Victorian 
Council for Civil Liberties commenced an action in the Federal Court.
205
 The 
applicants argued that, if the Migration Act applied, the Minister had duties under the 
Migration Act to allow the asylum seekers to apply for protection and be brought 
ashore to make applications.
206
 In the alternative, it was argued that if the Migration 
Act did not apply, the applicants were being unlawfully detained by the SAS 
troops.
207
 In Chu Kheng Lim, the High Court had authorised the immigration 
detention of ‘aliens’, where it was justified by legislation. Because the asylum 
seekers had not entered the ‘migration zone’, the applicants argued that the 
Migration Act did not apply, and thus there was no legislative basis for their 
detention or the Commonwealth’s actions against the Tampa. The applicants sought 
habeus corpous, relief from unlawful detention and an injunction against the removal 
of the ship. A temporary injunction was granted.
208
 
It was clear that the Government did not want to accept responsibility for processing 
or settling the Tampa asylum seekers. Three days before the trial, the Government 
announced it had come to an agreement with Nauru and New Zealand: New Zealand 
was to process and settle 150 of the asylum seekers, while Australia would fund 
Nauru to process the remaining asylum seekers, and if found to be refugees, they 
would be resettled in Australia.
209
 The crux of this case was the determination of the 
extent to which Australia’s obligations under the Refugee Convention would 
apply.
210
 If Australia owed the asylum seekers the duty of non-refoulement, this duty 
could be contravened by sending them to Nauru, as Australia could not guarantee 
that Nauru would not refoul the asylum seekers. The Court lifted the temporary 
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injunction, and the Government began to make arrangements to remove the asylum 
seekers. 
On September 11, 2001, North J of the Federal Court delivered his judgement, 
finding that the asylum seekers had in fact been unlawfully detained and the 
proposed expulsion from Australian territory was unlawful. North J ordered that the 
asylum seekers be returned to Australia.
211
 It was clear from North J’s judgment that 
the Commonwealth were attempting to avoid their obligations under the Refugee 
Convention.   
In this case, the evidence establishes that the respondents resolved that the 
situation would be handled so that the Act would not apply. That meant that 
the rescuees would not be given the chance to make applications for 
protection visas within the migration zone.
212
 
On the issue of unlawful detention, North J found that the asylum seekers had been 
detained, citing the troops control over the asylum seekers, directing them in what 
they were and were not allowed to do and the lack of communication and 
consultation.
213
 On the issue of expulsion, the Minister had argued that the power to 
expel ‘aliens’ was part of a prerogative power of the Commonwealth.214 However, 
North J found that the prerogative power did not apply to the expulsion of ‘aliens’ in 
this way, as the processes for expulsion had been clearly regulated by the Migration 
Act.
215
  
That evening terrorists executed attacks on the Twin Towers in New York. The 
September 11 attacks roused serious concerns for national security and border 
protection. These of course were valid concerns and fundamental for the governance 
and self-preservation of a nation, but it was the disregard for human rights that was 
alarming. The majority of asylum seekers coming to Australia were from the Middle 
East. The attitude towards asylum seekers hardened. Asylum seekers were now 
viewed as ‘potential terrorists’ rather than victims.216 The Government used both the 
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events of September 11 and the ‘War on Terror’ to its advantage,217 and began to 
handle asylum seeker policy as an issue of security and border protection, leaving 
little scope for human rights.  
2    Ruddock v Vadarlis
218
 
Minister Ruddock appealed to the Full Federal Court, on the grounds that North J 
had erred in finding that: (i) the asylum seekers had been detained, and (ii) the 
executive power of the Commonwealth did not authorise the expulsion or detention 
of the asylum seekers.
219
 In the decision handed down on 18 September, the majority 
of the Full Federal Court overturned the original decision and held that the Minister’s 
actions were valid. 
On the issue of the Commonwealth’s authority to detain and expel the asylum 
seekers, the majority found that the Commonwealth in fact had this authority. This 
authority is conferred by section 61 of the Constitution, which provides that the 
executive has the power to execute the laws of the Commonwealth. Section 61 is 
taken to also vest prerogative powers in the Crown.
220
 The power to expel non-
citizens was found to be a prerogative power, as it is an implied part of national 
sovereignty. The majority found that this prerogative power could not be easily 
displaced by statute.
221
 As per French J:  
The greater the significance of a particular executive power to national 
sovereignty, the less likely it is that…the Parliament would have intended to 
extinguish the power.
222
 
On the facts of this case, the majority held that the executive’s power to exclude 
‘aliens’ was too significant to be subjected to Parliament’s control. On the issue of 
unlawful detention, Court found North J had erred in finding that there was a total 
restraint on freedom, as he had focused on the Commonwealth’s control over the 
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asylum seekers.
223
 The Court agreed that a public authority could act in a way that 
resulted in a person’s freedom being restricted where it is authorised by law.224 
The act of the Commonwealth in barring the landing of the rescues in any 
event could not, in my opinion, constitute a restraint on their liberty which 
was amenable to habeus corpus.
225
 
It was found that there was no detention and the actions of the Commonwealth were 
properly incidental in preventing the asylum seekers to come to Australia, ‘where 
they had no right to go’.226 The presence of the SAS troops on board, in combination 
with any other factors, did not constitute detention.
227
 Therefore, the actions of the 
Minister and the Commonwealth in detaining and expelling the asylum seekers were 
lawful as they were merely incidental to the executive power to exclude ‘aliens’ from 
entering Australia.
228
 Leave to appeal to the High Court was refused. 
(a)    Significance of the judgment 
According to Crock, when it came to asylum seekers, this decision demonstrated that 
the judiciary was willing to broaden the powers of the executive if it would protect 
Australia’s sovereignty.229 The Court recognised that the legislature could abrogate 
the powers of the executive,
230
 and that the Migration Act intended to do so.
231
 
However, the Court took a broad interpretation of the executive’s power to expel 
‘aliens’, referring to the great importance of state sovereignty; 
The power to determine who may come into Australia is so central to its 
sovereignty that it is not supposed that the Government of the nation would 
lack under the power conferred upon it by the Constitution, the ability to 
prevent people not part of the Australian community, from entering.
232
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The Court held that if Parliament had intended to abrogate this executive power, 
there must have been express words to that effect and a clear intention to deprive the 
executive of this power, due to its importance.
233
  
Significant to this judgment was the way in which the Court interpreted Australia’s 
international obligations. It is generally accepted that provisions of an international 
treaty do not form part of Australia’s domestic law unless it has been expressly 
incorporated by statute.
234
 The Refugee Convention has been ratified, but not 
expressly incorporated into domestic law, so it alone is not a direct source of rights. 
In Chu Kheng Lim, the Court held that if the legislation is ambiguous, it should be 
constructed in a way that accords with Australia’s obligations under that 
convention.
235
  
The judgment in Ruddock v Vadarliss indicated a disregard for the principles of the 
Refugee Convention in domestic law.
236
 Beaumont J stated that ‘this is a municipal, 
and not an international court’, and, while there is an obligation to rescue the Tampa 
asylum seekers under customary international law, there is no obligation to resettle 
them in Australia.
237
 Beaumont J had refused to consider the question as to whether 
the people rescued were refugees, or whether the expulsion of the asylum seekers 
would amount to refoulement. The Court held that nothing the Commonwealth did 
would amount to a breach of the obligations under the Refugee Convention.
238
 
Furthermore, French J provided:  
It is questionable whether entry by the Executive into a convention thereby 
fetters the executive power under the Constitution.
239
 
Notably, as in Chu Kheng Lim, the courts were willing to read down international 
law and play a passive role in adjudicating on human rights. The Court justified this 
approach by taking a broad interpretation of the powers conferred on the executive. 
The Court was not willing to let executive powers be fettered by provisions of 
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domestic law and was certainly not willing to let it be abrogated by an unratified 
convention.  
3    The Government’s Response: the ‘Pacific Solution’ 
After the Court’s decision, the Howard Government established the Pacific Solution: 
a new system for dealing with asylum seekers who arrived by boat. Under the Pacific 
Solution, the Commonwealth had the power to intercept boats and take asylum 
seekers to offshore processing centres on Nauru and Manus Island, Papua New 
Guinea (PNG), to determine their refugee status. The Pacific Solution marked the 
beginning of a repressive policy for asylum seekers,
240
 one that watered down the 
obligations under the Refugee Convention. The legislative basis for the Pacific 
Solution was established when Parliament hastily passed seven acts in one day.
241
 It 
was clear that Australia wanted no responsibility for the asylum seekers arriving to 
its shores. Three of these acts established the legal foundation for offshore 
processing under the Pacific Solution.
242
 
Firstly, certain areas were excised from Australia’s migration zone, by way of the 
Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act 2001 (Cth). Under this 
act, Christmas Island, Ashmore and Cartier Islands and Cocos (Keeling) Islands were 
defined as ‘offshore excised territories’.243 A person who arrived to these territories 
was prohibited from making an application for protection, unless permitted by the 
Minister at his discretion.
244
 Interestingly, Australia was prepared to reduce its 
territorial self in order to evade its obligations under the Refugee Convention.
245
 The 
constitutional validity of the excision of Australia’s territory was affirmed by the 
High Court in 2010.
246
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The second act that was key to establishing the Pacific Solution was the Migration 
Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone (Consequential Provisions) Act 2001 
(Cth). Under this act, asylum seekers who arrived at an ‘offshore excised territory’ 
could be detained and transferred to a ‘declared country’ for their claims to be 
processed. The Minister could declare a country if that country ‘meets the relevant 
human rights standards’ in providing protection.247 The Minister declared Nauru and 
Manus Island in PNG to be ‘declared’ countries and soon after signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding with each.  
Thirdly, the Government made provisions to validate the actions it took in relation to 
the Tampa Affair, by way of the Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement 
Powers) Act 2001 (Cth). This Act allowed new protection powers of interdiction, 
providing that a ship or aircraft carrying asylum seekers could be detained and 
brought to ‘another place’.248 It also gave the Commonwealth powers to eject 
persons who had crossed the borders.
249
 This allowed Commonwealth officials to 
intercept boats en route to Australia and either return them to Indonesia or transfer 
them to Nauru or Manus Island.  
4    Section 474: The Privative Clause  
As a part of the Pacific Solution legislation, the Government passed the Migration 
Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001 (Cth). The amending act inserted 
a privative clause into the Migration Act under section 474. This conflicts with the 
High Court’s original jurisdiction under section 75(v) of the Constitution, to review 
decisions of the executive. Section 474 prohibits the courts from reviewing a 
‘privative clause decision’, which, by way of its extensive definition, applied to most 
immigration cases. This includes the decisions to grant, suspend or cancel a visa, 
imposing a restriction or condition, or ‘doing or refusing to do any other act or 
thing’.250 According to Brennan, this left no avenue for genuine refugees who had 
been given unfavourable decisions.
251
 Under sections 477 and 486A, there was a 35-
day time limit for applicants to bring cases to the Federal Court and High Court 
respectively.  
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One of the most significant judgments on the interpretation of the privative clause 
was handed down in Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia.
252
 The court 
had to consider the constitutional legality of the privative clause of section 474 and 
the time limit under section 486A.
253
 The court upheld the provision but in order to 
avoid it from infringing section 75(v) of the Constitution, interpreted section 474 
narrowly so that in practice, it is effectively redundant.
254
 The judgment in Plaintiff 
S157 was a marked shift from earlier jurisprudence. The High Court took an 
approach that emphasised the protection of the fundamental rights of individuals. 
Rather than disregarding international obligations, the High Court now emphasised 
them. Gleeson CJ held that the rights of individuals and international obligations 
must be considered when interpreting the Migration Act:  
…The provisions of the Act concerning protection visas…are only part of a 
wider, and more detailed, pattern of legislation which, in a variety of respects, 
affects fundamental human rights and involves Australia’s international 
obligations.
255
  
The High Court recognised that decisions concerning refugee status are so significant 
to the individual that a high level of protection is needed. Traditionally privative 
clauses would protect a decision if it adhered to the Hickman principles however; 
Gleeson CJ sought to set a higher standard:  
People whose fundamental rights are at stake are ordinarily entitled to expect 
more than good faith. They are ordinarily entitled to expect fairness.
256
 
In this judgment, the Court acknowledged its responsibility to protect the 
fundamental rights of individuals and to uphold the rule of law. The joint majority 
judgment provided that the jurisdiction conferred by section 75(v) of the Constitution  
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is highly important as it is: 
[a] means of assuring to all people affected that officers of the 
Commonwealth obey the law and neither exceed nor neglect any jurisdiction 
which the law confers on them.
257
 
5    Implications of Offshore Processing for the Refugee Convention 
(a)    Refoulement within Australia’s offshore processing arrangements 
The most significant right that can be violated by regional processing arrangements 
is non-refoulement. Australia has an obligation under the Refugee Convention to 
ensure that people within its territory who meet the definition of refugee are not 
refouled.
258
 The obligation of non-refoulement does not only apply to sending an 
asylum seeker back to their country of origin but also applies to the transferring of 
asylum seekers to third countries.
259
  
Australia is not relieved of its obligations by simply sending asylum seekers to third 
countries. Essentially, according to principles of state responsibility, Australia is 
bound to ensure that asylum seekers are having their human rights recognised in any 
regional arrangement.
 260
 Australia will remain totally or partially responsible for the 
actions that occur after transferring asylum seekers to Nauru and PNG.
261
 Therefore 
Australia must establish that the asylum seeker will: be treated in accordance with 
accepted international standards, have effective protection against refoulement, and 
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have the possibility to seek and enjoy asylum.
262
 There are two ways in which 
transferring asylum seekers to a third country can constitute refoulement.
263
   
Firstly, the situation in the third country itself could pose a risk of persecution to the 
asylum seeker.
264
 Australia must be able to ensure that the third countries involved in 
offshore processing arrangements have adequate protections in place and will not 
generate in asylum seekers a fear of persecution. The Australian Human Rights 
Commission has expressed concern over the quality of protection in both Nauru and 
PNG.
265
 According to the UNHCR, the safe third country must be a party to the 
Refugee Convention. When the Government first established the processing of 
asylum seeker claims in Nauru in 2001, Nauru was not a party to the Refugee 
Convention. Nauru and PNG are now both signatories to the Refugee Convention. 
However, PNG has made a number of reservations to several important articles of 
the Refugee Convention.
266
 Furthermore, the UNHCR provides that a third country 
must comply with refugee law in practice.
267
  
The UNHCR has expressed concerns about the human rights framework in both 
Nauru and PNG.
268
 Disturbingly, in PNG, there is no effective framework for 
refugee issues. For both PNG and Nauru, there are ‘serious shortcomings’ in the 
transfer, receipt and processing of asylum seekers under these regional 
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arrangements.
269
 It is clear that the quality of protection is of concern.
270
 Given the 
well-known shortcomings in the human rights framework, it is difficult and almost 
impossible for Australia to guarantee that the asylum seekers who are sent to Nauru 
and PNG are being protected from refoulement.
271 
Secondly, the third country may send an asylum seeker to another place where there 
is a risk of persecution.
272
 An asylum seeker can be at risk of refoulement where a 
third country fails to correctly identify refugees. The principle of non-refoulement 
requires states to provide asylum seekers with access to fair and effective procedures 
for determining status and protection needs.
273
 Because the consequences of a 
genuine refugee being refouled can be very serious, it is fundamental that claims are 
properly assessed.
274
 The UNHCR has expressed concerns about the adequacy of the 
determination procedures provided in Nauru and PNG.
275
 Nauru and PNG do not 
make individualised assessments on each asylum seekers need for detention.
276
 In 
addition, the immigration officers determining the claims have little training or 
experience.
277
 It is clear from these shortfalls that there is a real likelihood of 
refugees being refouled by Nauru and PNG.  
(b)    Other Rights at stake under Offshore Processing Arrangements 
All asylum seekers transferred to Nauru and PNG have been subjected to mandatory 
detention.
278
 In Nauru and PNG, there have been delays in processing protection 
claims, which has led to prolonged detention. The mandatory and prolonged nature 
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of the detention will constitute arbitrary detention.
279 
 Australia is in breach of the 
obligations under the ICCPR and the Convention Against Torture to ensure that 
people are not returned to a country where there is a risk of harm through arbitrary 
detention or torture.
280
  
The Human Rights Commission has found the conditions in the detention centres to 
be extremely poor.
281
 This may breach the obligations under the ICCPR to ensure 
that people in detention are not subjected to degrading treatment, and are treated 
humanely and with dignity.
282
 The UNHCR has found the conditions in Nauru to be 
‘harsh and unsatisfactory’,283 and the centres in PNG were described as extremely 
hot and overcrowded.
284
 These poor conditions have been deemed to have a 
detrimental impact on the mental and physical health of asylum seekers.
285
 Studies 
have found high incidences of depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress 
disorder.
286
 This could constitute a violation of the right to health under the 
ICESCR,
287
 and the prohibition against degrading treatment under the ICCPR.
288
  In 
addition, the detention of children at these facilities is prolonged and mandatory. 
This has breached obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child such 
as to detain a child as a measure of last resort.
289
  
(c)    The Current Status of Offshore Processing 
It must be noted that the flow of boats was significantly reduced after the Pacific 
Solution was established in 2001.
290
 Numbers of arrivals remained low for the 
ensuing years. However, in 2008 the ALP, who was concerned with the humanitarian 
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issues, dismantled the Pacific Solution.
291
 The number of asylum seekers came to an 
unprecedented rise in 2012: Australia received 15,800 applications that year.
292
 
Under pressure to come to a solution, the Government commissioned the Houston 
Report.
 
The rhetoric of the Houston Report was compassionate and humanitarian.
293
 
However, in practice it encouraged a return to the harsh elements of the Liberal 
Government’s policy. Billings suggests that the Houston Report was commissioned 
to provide a cover for the ALP’s policy retreat.294 The ALP’s acceptance of the 
Houston Report signalled that asylum seeker policy had become bipartisan. 
Recommendations 8 and 9 suggested to re-establish offshore processing centres in 
Nauru and PNG respectively. The government was quick to give these 
recommendations effect.
295
 Asylum seekers began to be transferred to these centres 
in September 2012 and this has continued since,
296
 despite the well-known human 
rights costs of these offshore processing arrangements, 
D    Fourth Wave: The Malaysia Solution in 2011 
Amidst another wave of asylum seeker arrivals, the ALP attempted to strike a deal 
with Malaysia. This deal would put Australia in serious breach of the obligation of 
non-refoulement. It was established on a similar basis as the arrangements with 
Nauru and PNG. However, this time a High Court challenge rendered it invalid.
297
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This was a turning point in asylum seeker jurisprudence, with the High Court now 
willing to uphold the obligation of non-refoulement in domestic law.  
1    The Arrangement 
The Government entered into an arrangement with Malaysia on 25 July 2011.
298
 
Under the ‘Arrangement between the Government of Australia and the Government 
of Malaysia on Transfer and Resettlement’ (the Arrangement),299 Australia would 
transfer 800 asylum seekers who arrived by boat to Malaysia, in return for resettling 
1,000 refugees per year who were living in Malaysia, for up to four years. Because of 
the absence of protection framework in Malaysia, the Arrangement provided that the 
claims of asylum seekers would be assessed by the UNHCR.  
The legislative basis for the Arrangement was by way of sections 198(2) and 198A 
of the Migration Act. Essentially, these sections gave power to an officer of the 
Commonwealth to remove an unlawful non-citizen from Australia and transfer them 
to a declared country.
300
 Under section 198A(3) the Minister could declare a country 
as an offshore processing country if it: (i) provides asylum seekers with access to 
effective procedures for assessing their claim, (ii) provides protection for asylum 
seekers while their claim is determined, (iii) provides protection to persons who are 
determined to be refugees, and (iv) meets relevant human rights standards in 
providing that protection.
301
  
Importantly, Malaysia is not a signatory to the Refugee Convention and does not 
have a legislative framework for refugee matters.
302
 Since refugees and asylum 
seekers are not recognised, they are often subject to the same penalties as non-
citizens. Significantly, this includes the possibility of deportation,
303
 which in the 
case of a refugee, amounts to refoulement. Malaysia also faces issues of sexual-based 
violence and child abuse and has retained the death penalty.
 304
 Despite the obvious 
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lack of protection in Malaysia, the Minister issued an Instrument of Declaration,
305
 
making Malaysia a ‘declared’ country. 
2    Challenging the legality of the Malaysia Arrangement 
On 4 August 2011, a boat carrying 42 asylum seekers arrived at Christmas Island. 
These were to be the first group of asylum seekers to be sent to Malaysia under the 
Arrangement. On the 7 August 2011, proceedings were commenced in the High 
Court on behalf of the asylum seekers, who were due to be transferred to Malaysia 
the following day. The proceedings involved two separate applications: plaintiff M70 
who was an adult, and plaintiff M106 who was an unaccompanied minor. Both 
plaintiffs sought an injunction against their removal to Malaysia. Justice Hayes 
granted interlocutory relief the following day.
306
  
The plaintiffs argued that the Minister’s declaration of Malaysia as a ‘declared 
country’ was not valid as the requirements of section 198A(3) did not exist, or as the 
Minister could not be satisfied that the criteria were met. They cited the well-known 
shortcomings in Malaysia’s human rights protection framework; given that Malaysia 
was not a party to the Refugee Convention, the ICCPR, the ICESCR and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. The plaintiffs therefore argued that the 
applicants could not be removed to Malaysia. In addition, the plaintiffs argued that 
the pending removal would violate non-refoulement under the Refugee Convention. 
With respect to plaintiff M106, there was an additional ground argued for the 
Minister’s decision being invalid. The plaintiff was an unaccompanied minor. 
According to the Immigration (Guardianship of Children) Act 1946 (Cth) (the IGOC 
Act), the Minister is the legal guardian of non-citizen children upon their arrival in 
Australia, until they leave Australia permanently, which includes being removed 
under section 198 of the Migration Act.
307
 A non-citizen child cannot leave Australia, 
unless with the written consent of the Minister, who must consider whether allowing 
the child to leave would be prejudicial to the best interests of the child.
308
 As the 
legal guardian of M106, the Minister should have considered whether it was in the 
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child’s interests to leave Australia, or to allow the child to apply for a visa under 
section 46 of the Migration Act. 
(a)    A Turning Point in Asylum Seeker Jurisprudence  
On 31 August 2011, the High Court handed down a decision for both applicants in 
Plaintiffs M70/M106. Significantly, the High Court ruled by a clear majority of 6:1 
that the removal of the asylum seekers to Malaysia was invalid. In a joint judgment 
handed down by Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ, it was found that the 
Minister’s declaration of Malaysia as a declared country was invalid, as it was 
affected by a jurisdictional error. The Minister could not establish the jurisdictional 
facts for the following reasons. Firstly, Malaysia does not have any provisions for 
refugees or asylum seekers domestically under the Immigration Act 1959 
(Malaysia).
309
 Nor had Malaysia undertaken any activities in receiving, processing or 
determining the claims of asylum seekers.
310
 Secondly, Malaysia is not a party to the 
Refugee Convention or its Optional Protocol. Finally, the Arrangement did not 
impose any legally binding responsibilities or obligations on Malaysia that would 
ensure that they accorded the appropriate protections required by the Refugee 
Convention.
311
 Therefore, the Minister’s declaration of Malaysia as a declared 
country was invalid and could not authorise the removal of the plaintiffs.
312
 With 
respect to the plaintiff M106, the Minister failed to give consent in writing, and had 
not given any consideration to the child’s best interests.313 The effect of the High 
Court’s decision was that the Arrangement with Malaysia was invalid.  
(b)    Impact of the Plaintiffs M70/M106 Decision 
This High Court decision was significant in two ways. Firstly, it demonstrated a 
willingness of the courts to impose international obligations under the Refugee 
Convention into domestic law and to protect fundamental rights. The High Court had 
first signalled the significance of Australia’s international obligations in Plaintiff 
S157. Despite the fact that this was primarily a case turning on statutory 
interpretation, Wood and McAdam illustrate that the Court was willing to consider 
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obligations under the Refugee Convention.
314
 The joint majority judgment began 
with a discussion of Australia’s obligations under the Refugee Convention, especially 
with regard to non-refoulement. The obligation of non-refoulement was interpreted in 
a much broader way, as set out in the joint majority judgment: 
Accordingly, for Australia to remove a person from its territory, whether to 
the person's country of nationality or to some third country willing to receive 
the person, without Australia first having decided whether the person 
concerned has a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason 
may put Australia in breach of the obligations… in particular the non-
refoulement obligation.
315
 
With respect to section 198A, the High Court favoured an interpretation that was 
consistent with the Refugee Convention, as indicated by Kiefel J: 
This construction of s 198A(3)(a) most closely accords with the fulfillment of 
Australia's Convention obligations and it is to be preferred to one which does 
not.
316
 
The High Court held that the terms used in section 198A, such as ‘provides access’ 
and ‘provides protection’ reflect the intent that the determination procedures in the 
declared country must to be compliant with the Refugee Convention.
317
   
Secondly, this decision was important for the relationship between Parliament and 
the courts. The Government had confidence in the Arrangement, as a similar 
arrangement between Australia and both Nauru and PNG had been tested and 
accepted by the High Court.
318
 The Commonwealth argued on similar grounds, but 
this time without success. The High Court disregarded the fact that section 198A was 
used as the foundation of asylum seeker processing in Nauru.
319
 The Court  
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distinguished this case from the agreement with Nauru: 
…[E]ven assuming them to be in some way relevant, the arrangements made 
with Nauru were very different from those that are now in issue. Not least is 
that so because Australia, not Nauru as the receiving country, was to provide 
or secure the provision of the assessment and other steps that had to be taken, 
as well as the maintenance in the meantime of those who claimed to be 
seeking protection. Thus it was Australia, not the receiving country that was 
to provide the access and protections in question.
320
 
The decision of the High Court was criticised by the Government, for restricting the 
power of Parliament to deal with boat arrivals.
321
 However, Crock and Kenny 
highlight that when the Court previously accepted a similar policy, other factors were 
at play, such as war and terrorism.
322
 Therefore, the same outcome could not be 
expected a decade later, in comparatively calmer circumstances.
323
  
After this judgment was handed down, the Government persisted with the 
Arrangement. A Bill was introduced to Parliament on 22 September 2011 that sought 
to give the Minister the power to declare any state to be an offshore processing state 
if the Minister deemed it to be in the national interest to do so.
324
 The Bill also 
sought to circumvent the Minister’s obligations under the IGOC Act, as it held that 
nothing should affect the Minister from exercising his power under the Migration Act 
to remove a non-citizen child from Australia to an offshore processing country.
325
 
However, with dwindling support for the Bill and much criticism from the Liberal 
party, the Government announced it would not be pursued.
326
  
The attempt to make this Arrangement with Malaysia demonstrated Australia’s 
willingness to violate its obligations under the Refugee Convention, especially in 
relation to non-refoulement. The inadequacy of Malaysia’s refugee protection 
framework is blatantly apparent and even after the High Court ruled that it would be 
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in breach of non-refoulement, the Government persisted. This is a clear example of 
the great lengths Australia will go to, in order to circumvent its obligations. It has 
been demonstrated that with each wave of asylum seekers, Australia has departed 
further and further from its obligations. The following chapter will seek to examine 
why Australia has shown such reluctance. 
 
IV     THE PROBLEMS AND FUTURE OF THE REFUGEE 
CONVENTION 
A    The Limitations of the Refugee Convention 
By virtue of the prohibition against refoulement, when an asylum seeker arrives 
within a State’s territory, that State must allow the asylum seeker to enter and must 
decide whether or not that asylum seeker is a refugee. Until the 1980’s, the Refugee 
Convention was a relatively effective instrument in providing this protection to 
refugees.
327
 However, substantial numbers of people began fleeing their homes and 
notions of asylum became highly politicised.
328
 In the last few decades, States have 
been critical of the Refugee Convention and shown an increasing reluctance to 
provide protection.
329
 In practice, the Refugee Convention is not being honoured and 
does not attract the same significance it once did. This led to the proposition that the 
Refugee Convention is no longer relevant, and should be abandoned.
330
  
Crock has divided the criticisms of the Refugee Convention as viewed from three 
different standpoints: from the perspective of asylum seekers, from a universal 
perspective, and from Australia’s position.331 For asylum seekers and refugee 
advocates, the definition of refugee is too narrow and excludes certain people who 
should be protected as their life and security is under threat.
332
 From a universal 
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perspective, the Refugee Convention has been criticised for being inequitable to 
camp refugees and for its failure to provide a standard framework for implementing 
the obligations. The major criticisms from States such as Australia are the high 
financial cost of the determination procedures and the concern with ‘economic 
migrants’ making false claims under the Refugee Convention.333 These factors have 
caused Australia, as well as other States, to adopt a range of harsh and deterrent 
measures in order to restrict their obligations under the Refugee Convention. To 
assert its continuing significance, the criticisms of the Refugee Convention need to be 
addressed. 
1    The Definition of Refugee 
From the perspective of asylum seekers and refugee advocates, the definition of 
refugee under the Refugee Convention is too narrow. The definition of refugee is 
found in Article 1A of the Refugee Convention. It defines a refugee as a person who 
is outside their country of nationality and is unable or unwilling to return, owing to a 
well-founded fear of being persecuted on account of their race, religion, nationality, 
political opinion or membership of a particular social group (hereafter referred to as 
a ‘Convention reason’).334  
States then owe a duty not to refoul a person who comes within this definition of 
refugee. States are concerned with restricting the number of people entering their 
territory under the Refugee Convention. To that end, many States have adopted a 
narrow interpretation of the refugee definition, so that the obligation of non-
refoulement is not as far reaching. 
335
 
Owing to the concern of the Nazi’s persecution of the Jews, the refugee definition is 
focused on notions of individual persecution.
336
 To be recognised as a refugee under 
the Refugee Convention, asylum seekers must establish that they, as an individual, 
have a well-founded fear of persecution and that this persecution is for a Convention 
reason. The Refugee Convention therefore imposes on States the duty not to refoul: 
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but not for all those in need, nor for all those fearing persecution.
337
 Upon a strict 
interpretation, the definition of refugee excludes people who are fleeing: (i) poverty 
and natural disasters, and (ii) war, generalised violence and grave human rights 
abuses.
338
 Crock, Saul and Dastyari assert that people who are threatened by poverty, 
natural disasters, war and generalised violence do not fall within the Refugee 
Convention definition of refugee, as it necessitates proof of individual persecution.
339
 
As highlighted by Fontaine, this has led some to conclude that the definition is 
‘disproportionally concerned with the issue of persecution’ and ‘out of step with our 
times’.340 What makes this application of the Refugee Convention controversial is 
that natural disasters and generalised threats can, just as persecution for a Convention 
reason, pose a threat to a person’s life and security.341 
Because States are trying to restrict their obligations under the Refugee Convention 
by adopting a narrow definition, Walker believes it is timely to defend the 
definition.
342
 Walker engages in a discussion as to whether a narrow construction of 
the definition of refugee can be justified. Walker essentially questions whether it is 
valid to exclude people who are fleeing their home country due to hardships such as 
natural disasters or generalised violence from the protection of the Refugee 
Convention.  
Walker accepts that there is a moral obligation to help people in dire need, by 
drawing on Singer and Singer’s principle of mutual aid. Singer and Singer argue that 
if a State can provide assistance to a person in dire need, with little cost, there is a 
moral obligation to provide that assistance.
343
 The obligation will arise, whether the 
dire need is caused by poverty and famine, or war and generalised violence. This is 
because natural disasters and generalised threats can also pose a threat to a person’s 
life and security.
344
 It is indeed the moral proposition to help vulnerable people in 
need that informed the Refugee Convention. For Shacknove the focus on persecution 
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is unfounded and cannot be justified. Shacknove argues that the definition of refugee 
has drawn a line between people whose needs are morally equivalent. The author 
argues that what characterises a person as a refugee is that their State has failed to 
protect their basic needs: to be protected from threats to their life, security and 
welfare.
345
 And where the state fails to protect these basic needs, we should owe the 
same duty as we owe to those who are being persecuted for a Convention reason.
346
  
Walker contends that there is a ‘plausible argument’ for justifying why the Refugee 
Convention does not extend to people affected by other hardships. According to 
Walker, there is a stronger moral obligation to help those people who are persecuted 
for a Convention reason ahead of others.
347
 Walker’s argument is based on the 
position that, because the person’s ties with their country of nationality have not been 
broken, they do not need to be afforded the protection of non-refoulement.
348
 Walker 
provides two reasons for this. Firstly, there is no human agent responsible for natural 
disasters or famine, at least in the way that the threat is not posed by an oppressive 
government or state persecutor, and therefore the moral obligation to help is not as 
strong.
349
 However, Shackonve contends that natural disasters are in fact often 
complicated by human actions.
350
 For example, a State might fail to take actions to 
mitigate the human consequences of a minor natural disaster, bringing an element of 
responsibility.
351
  
Secondly for Walker, people affected by natural disasters have different needs to 
people affected by persecution for a Convention reason. Accordingly a different 
response is required, one which does not require the Refugee Convention.
352
 Rather 
the type of assistance required would be in the form of the provision of humanitarian 
aid and rebuilding infrastructure, for which people can look to their own state for 
protection.
353
  
Shacknove does not accept this proposition. Shacknove highlights that States might 
lack the resources to provide assistance in natural disasters. Even if the State has the 
                                                        
345
 Ibid 276-7. 
346
 Ibid 281. 
347
 Walker, Above n 336, 598. 
348
 Ibid 600. 
349
 Ibid 599. 
350
 Shacknove, Above n 332, 279. 
351
 Ibid. 
352
 Walker, Above n 336, 598. 
353
 Ibid 600. 
 55 
resources to assist, they might lack: (i) the technology required to process the 
recources, (ii) the sufficient infrastructure or (iii) the methods for distribution.
354
 
These latter three conditions are within human control. Shacknove also considers that 
often States will be unwilling to provide assistance. For example, a corrupt 
government might withhold supplies or misappropriate humanitarian aid.
355
 
According to Shacknove, this leaves no choice but to seek protection 
internationally.
356
  
Following on from this, many commentators such as Gunning,
357
 Schacknove,
358
 
Dummet,
359
 Bagaric and Dimopoulos
360
 have argued for the definition of refugee to 
be expanded to reflect the current causes of displacement.
361
 However, expanding the 
scope of an already struggling regime would have little success. It should be noted 
that other refugee advocates, such as Frelick and Saul, do not want the definition of 
refugee to be opened for debate, as they fear that if the definition of refugee were to 
be amended, it would result in being more restrictive than it currently is.
362
 Indeed, 
Carens warns: 
In seeking to advance the interests of refugees and other needy people we 
should be careful not to undermine the legitimacy of one of the few 
institutions that offer them any sort of protection and hope.
363
 
Whether it is agreeable that the definition of a refugee is too narrow, it must be 
considered that the Refugee Convention, as an international instrument, must be an 
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instrument of compromise. The Refugee Convention was drafted with the goal of 
providing assistance to vulnerable refugees.
364
 While States agreed with the 
humanitarian principles of the Refugee Convention, they expressed concern or 
reluctance to sign on if States would be obliged to protect a broad range of people.
365
 
States did not want to be responsible to all those in need, such as those fleeing 
natural disasters and poverty, nor to all those fleeing any type of persecution, for 
example as those subjected to war and generalised violence. There are vast numbers 
of people threatened by these hardships, and States had the genuine concern that, had 
the Refugee Convention applied in this way, States would become extremely 
overburdened. Accordingly, this produced a limited definition of refugee.
366
 This 
concern was evident at the drafting of the Refugee Convention and is just as strongly 
present today. As Walker suggests: 
Many states are concerned that uncontrolled immigration will result in a 
flood of immigrants, which will overly tax the resources of the receiving 
state. 
367
 
Certainly this theme continues to colour the application of the Refugee Convention 
today. All the same, it is clear that to refoul an asylum seeker fleeing such hardships 
would be to return them to a potentially dangerous future, in just the same way as 
expelling a person fleeing persecution for a Convention reason.  
2    Failure to Consider Rights of Camp Refugees 
A universally held complaint about the Refugee Convention is that it is inequitable as 
it favours those who are mobile and wealthy. The regular channel for asylum seekers 
is, having left their country of origin, to register at a UNHCR Office in countries of 
first asylum. The UNHCR undertakes the ‘recording, verifying and updating of 
information’ on people of concern.368 The asylum seekers are hosted in camps, which 
are located in host countries such as Pakistan and the Congo.  It is there they wait to 
be resettled by participating countries. Over the last five decades, Australia has 
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resettled around 600,000 people from refugee camps.
369
 The UNHCR typically 
resettles asylum seekers with the highest needs, but for the most part, the focus is on 
repatriation. 
The Refugee Convention does not confer any rights on asylum seekers who pursue 
regular channels. It contains rights and obligations relating only to those people who 
enter a State’s jurisdiction. Therefore, Crock, Saul and Dastyari argue that it favours 
those who are able to get to a country of asylum.
370
 This has created a channel for 
irregular movement, as asylum seekers are motivated to travel to another country, as 
their chance of resettlement is far greater. By failing to consider the rights of camp 
refugees, the Refugee Convention has encouraged the irregular movement of asylum 
seekers, which poses a threat to the sovereignty and border control of States.  
In addition, the failure to consider the rights of camp refugees has created a moral 
predicament for States. States have a limited capacity to provide protection, so must 
decide whether to provide protection to the UNHCR recognised refugees waiting 
patiently in camps, or to the asylum seekers who are able to make the sea voyage. As 
Brennan highlights, there is a stronger desire to help the asylum seekers who arrive 
to Australia than to help the refugees waiting in a camp overseas.
371
 The Refugee 
Convention does not provide a way to reconcile the rights of camp refugees with 
those of Convention refugees.
372
 It creates obligations to asylum seekers who are 
present, and does not give priority to those with the greatest need. Milbank argues 
that this renders it unfair to camp refugees and those people who are unable to get to 
a safe third country.
373
  
3    The Failure to Provide A Practical Framework   
Another universal complaint about the Refugee Convention is the failure of the 
Refugee Convention to provide an approach when implementing the obligations in a 
practical sense.
374
 For the most part, the Refugee Convention is aimed at establishing 
the rights to be afforded to those who have been determined to be refugees. It 
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provides an impetus for States to establish a systematic refugee program. However, 
the most contentious issues arise when States receive asylum seekers in their 
territories and must make a refugee status determination, for which the Refugee 
Convention provides little framework.
375
 The reason the Refugee Convention does 
not provide a practical framework is because the obligations under the Refugee 
Convention must be reconciled with state sovereignty. For sovereign states, no 
outside rule or law can influence what happens within its territory.
376
 Therefore, the 
decision on how to implement the obligations is to be decided by State Parties.
377
 
With no real limitations on a preference for state sovereignty, the absence of a 
practical framework has left room for States to formulate policies that are not 
compliant with the Refugee Convention, producing great inconsistencies in how the 
Refugee Convention is interpreted and applied from one State to another. 
Interestingly, the Refugee Convention does not include an obligation on States to 
examine claims; this obligation arises through the operation of the non-refoulement 
principle. Implicitly, States must receive, process and determine the claims of asylum 
seekers who arrive in their territory, in order to ensure that a refugee is not being 
returned to a place where they fear persecution. However, the Refugee Convention 
fails to provide any framework for doing so. It is up to Australia to decide how to 
process and determine asylum seekers. This has had significant consequences for 
asylum seekers, and especially with respect to non-refoulement. Asylum seekers who 
arrive within Australia’s territory are sent to PNG and Nauru. It is clear from the 
human rights framework in Nauru and PNG, asylum seekers sent there by Australia 
are at risk of refoulement.
 378
 However, the Refugee Convention does not prohibit 
offshore processing arrangements, nor provide any guidelines or limitations on it, 
allowing the arrangements to continue unrestrained by international obligations.   
There is no requisite procedure on how States should decide claims for protection.
379
 
The effective determination of claims is paramount. If claims are not assessed 
properly, a bona fide refugee may be denied protection, thereby constituting 
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refoulement. While the UNHCR and the Executive Committee have provided some 
direction on how to determine claims,
380
 these are not binding. Under Australia’s 
offshore processing arrangements, the claims of asylum seekers are being determined 
in Nauru and PNG. It is clear that there are major shortcomings in the assessment of 
claims, as immigration officers are untrained and inexperienced,
381
 indicating the 
likely failure of Australia to uphold the duty not to refoul refugees.  
The Refugee Convention does not prescribe measures States should take while the 
claims for protection are being processed. Feller argues that, if states are going to 
have a system of immigration detention, there should be some limitations on it, such 
as it should only be resorted to where necessary, and should not be mandatory or 
‘unduly prolonged’.382 After receiving the Cambodian asylum seekers in 1992, the 
government decided that all asylum seekers would be held in immigration detention 
while their claims were being determined.
383
 With few rules relating to immigration 
detention, Australia decided to detain asylum seekers, including children, for 
prolonged periods of time, amounting to arbitrary detention.  
It is clear from Australia’s policies that, the absence of a set framework has led to 
States being able to emphasise sovereignty at the expense of fulfilling the protection 
obligations under the Refugee Convention. Although it is recognised that if the 
Refugee Convention included a standards, it would be unlikely that States would 
agree to a specific regime. Given the vast differences in the economy and social, 
political and legal framework among the signatories, a model that is too specific 
would not be appropriate or effective for every State Party, and States would have 
been reluctant to sign on.  
There is no central authority to adjudicate on any violations of the Refugee 
Convention. The UNHCR oversees the implementation of the Refugee Convention. 
When States accede to the Refugee Convention, they undertake to co-operate with 
the UNHCR.
384
 The UNHCR is premised on co-operation and as such there is no 
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enforcement mechanism. If a State does not comply with the obligations under the 
Refugee Convention, the UNHCR can express its concern but this does little to 
redress the situation. For example, the UNHCR has expressed concern for 
Australia’s system of immigration detention since its inception, but it has remained a 
core feature of asylum policy. That said it is not expected that a democratic nation 
such as Australia should hand over sovereignty to the unelected members of the 
UNHCR. However it is clear that the absence of any mechanism to hold States 
accountable for breaching their obligations fosters non-compliance.  
4    The Financial Cost of Receiving Asylum Seekers 
More specific to the problems faced by Australia is the financial cost of the 
determination of asylum seeker claims. The Refugee Convention obliges countries to 
receive asylum seekers, determine their claims for protection and resettle where they 
are found to be refugees. In reality the Refugee Convention places a significant 
burden on receiving countries.
385
 Crock, Saul and Dastyari highlight that the 
financial cost involved with receiving and hosting asylum seekers and the 
determination procedure is significant.
386
 For Australia, a key component of the 
determination process is mandatory detention in offshore processing centres. In the 
2013-2014 Federal Budget, the total cost of immigration detention and offshore 
management increased to $2.97 billion.
387
 The high financial cost of determining 
claims is also reflected in other Western countries, with many spending ten times 
more on determination procedures than they contribute to the UNHCR.
388
  
There are other financial burdens involved in providing assistance and services to 
asylum seekers and refugees. The 2014-15 Federal Budget has allocated $27.8 
million to assisting asylum seekers while their status is being resolved.
389
  For those 
asylum seekers who are recognised as refugees, the Government will provide $574.1 
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million in support services over a five-year period.
390
 With such a high financial cost 
involved with asylum seekers, it is apparent why States are trying to restrict the 
number of people they owe obligations to.   
While Western countries are concerned with the genuinely significant financial cost 
of determining claims for protection, developing countries are struggling with the 
human responsibility. The majority of the refugee burden lies with the poorest 
countries of the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe that have the majority 
of the refugee burden.
391
 Hathaway highlights that the less developed countries, such 
as Chad and Syria, are hosting around 90% of the world’s refugees and have far 
fewer resources to do so.
392
 In these camps, the conditions are so poor that they are 
‘generally rights-abusive and often literally life threatening’.393 At the same time, 
Western countries are spending significant amounts of money on the comparatively 
minor numbers of refugees they receive.
394
 It is therefore argued that the burden and 
responsibilities of refugee protection must be reallocated.
395
  
The Refugee Convention emphasises the need for burden sharing between States and 
international co-operation. The Preamble of the Refugee Convention suggests that the 
drafters were mindful of the burden imposed by its obligations: 
… the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries. 
However, the Refugee Convention fails to provide any framework for States to re-
distribute the asylum burden. In addition to this, the Refugee Convention does not 
make responsibility sharing mandatory.
396
 This has resulted in the burdens and 
responsibilities of protecting refugees being hugely disproportionate.
397
 Indeed it is 
generally agreed that a more even distribution of the burden and responsibilities for 
asylum seekers would improve the political climate of asylum and ultimately 
                                                        
390
 Ibid. 
391
 Millbank, ‘Problem with the 1951 Refugee Convention’, Above n 369, 5. 
392
 James C. Hathaway, ‘Why Refugee Law Still Matters’ (2007) Feature: Melbourne 
Journal of International Law 6. Note that this has shifted and it is likely that Turkey is 
currently hosting the refugees who were in the camp in Syria.  
393
 Ibid 89. 
394
 Ibid 93. 
395
 Ibid 92. 
396
 Millbank, ‘Problem with the 1951 Refugee Convention’, Above n 369, ii. 
397
 Hathaway, ‘Why Refugee Law Still Matters’, Above n 392, 92. 
 62 
facilitate the protection of refugees.
398
 However, it is not clear how a reallocation 
would operate in practice.  
It would make sense for Western countries who spend a large amount of funds on 
determination procedures to instead contribute to economic development, 
humanitarian assistance and resettlement in developing countries.
399
 However, 
Aleinikoff contends that this is not realistic, nor durable.
400
 For Hathaway, if burden 
sharing is to be effective, the re-allocation of the burden and responsibilities must be 
more significant and binding.
401
 Hathaway continues that transferring resources to an 
overburdened host state must be underlined by respect for refugee law.
402
 Without 
respect for our obligations, Hathaway asserts that: 
we seem content to throw money at the less developed world as a sop to our 
consciences for the harsh treatment of refugees in our midst, even as we 
know that such resources do not dependably accrue to the real benefit of 
promoting the goals of refugee safety, autonomy, and self-reliance at the 
heart of the Refugee Convention.
403
  
Linderstrom echoes this idea, agreeing that while the political will is lacking, 
strategies will be ‘regarded as paying mere lip service to fashionable calls for 
partnership and sustained development’.404 This can be highlighted in the Australian 
context. The Australian Government’s regional arrangements with PNG and Nauru 
cannot be described as a bona fide burden sharing arrangement. It is known that 
these countries do not have adequate standards, nor do they adhere to the obligations 
under the Refugee Convention. These arrangements are not a genuine re-allocation, 
rather a diversion of asylum seekers from Australia on the ground that they will be 
protected by other countries.  
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For Hathaway, a burden sharing arrangement should not be unilateral, that is, 
instigated by a wealthy country to serve its own interests.
405
 Hathaway and Neve 
propose a model of burden sharing, called a model of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibility’.406 Under this model, States would form ‘interest convergence groups’ 
who would share the financial cost and responsibility for refugees. The groups would 
agree, prior to a mass refugee movement, on what each State would contribute, 
which would be based on their ‘strengths’.407 Every State would play a meaningful, 
but different role in the sharing of financial burdens, and also in assuming 
responsibility for protecting refugees.
408
 According to Hathaway and Neve, States 
would be more open to receiving refugees if the responsibility and cost were 
shared.
409
 
However, Anker, Fitzpatrick and Shacknove contend that Hathaway and Neve’s 
model is not feasible or politically viable. The authors argue that it is highly unlikely 
that Western nations would use any money saved on determination procedures to 
provide financial assistance to struggling host countries. 
410
 Indeed, the authors 
question whether states would save any money at all. It is further argued that states 
will not be able to come to agreements within their ‘interest convergence group’.411  
Under the current regime of refugee protection, this is not realistic.
412
 Indeed, the 
concern of Australia is the high financial cost of receiving and determining claims. In 
a burden sharing mechanism such as the model discussed, Australia would not be 
adequately relieved of this financial burden. This undoubtedly underlies the 
reluctance of Australia to submit to an alternative to the current regime under the 
Refugee Convention.  
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5    Concern with Misuse of the Refugee Convention  
Another factor leading to Australia’s reluctance to provide protection under the 
Refugee Convention is the concern that ‘economic migrants’ are using it to make 
false claims in order to start new lives in Western countries.
413
 It is difficult to 
determine whether a person is fleeing persecution for a Refugee Convention reason, 
or whether they are seeking economic advancement. Importantly as Millbank 
highlights, often there is no distinction between political persecution and economic 
hardships as they are often deeply intertwined.
414
  
Most asylum seekers however come from countries where economic failure 
and political instability and persecution and poverty are inextricably mixed. 
And despite the either/or nature of determinations, distinctions between 
individual asylum seekers can rarely be established with any degree of 
certainty.
415
 
This is because many who are experiencing poverty will also experience generalised 
violence and persecution.
416
 Therefore the causes of displacement may be so 
intertwined that they are not discernible in the first instance. Take for instance the 
current situation in Somalia. Somalia is experiencing ongoing armed conflict and the 
very real threat of further terrorist attacks in the capital, Mogadishu.
417
 At the same 
time, Somalia is experiencing severe poverty, famine and a health epidemic, with the 
outbreak of poliovirus.
418
 This is but one example of the many countries where 
people may be simultaneously threatened by both persecution for a Convention 
reason and economic disadvantage. 
As States are reluctant to provide protection to such a large number of people, it is 
easier for them to define people as ‘stowaways, boat people, economic migrants, 
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displaced persons, illegal aliens, or people who have been firmly resettled elsewhere’ 
in order to evade their obligations under the Refugee Convention.
419
 For example, the 
current Minister for Immigration, Scott Morrison stated that many people flee their 
country of nationality due to famine, poverty, health epidemics and financial 
collapse.
420
 Other causes of displacement include climate change and natural 
disasters such as floods.
421
 People fleeing these types of hardships do not come 
within the scope of the definition of refugee, as they are generally not facing 
persecution on account of their race, religion, nationality, political opinion or 
membership of a particular social group. They are referred to as ‘economic refugees’ 
and are perceived as illegitimate.  
While these causes of displacement are by no means new, several factors have arisen 
that have motivated people to take advantage of the opportunity to move to a country 
that would provide a better life.
422
 Firstly, the disparity between rich countries and 
poor countries is widening. Due to the increase in technology, the spread of 
information, particularly via the Internet, is faster and more efficient.
423
 This has 
made people increasingly aware that their living conditions are inferior to those in 
developed countries.
424
 Secondly, there have been advancements in technology, 
which make international travel and the engagement of people smugglers easier.
425
 
Therefore, more people are able to leave their country of nationality. Accordingly, 
they are drawn to Western countries for their economic opportunities, social welfare 
arrangements and political stability.
426
 
As ‘economic migrants’ do not come within the scope of the refugee definition, there 
is a genuine concern that people are making false claims of persecution under the 
Refugee Convention.
427
 This is especially so as there is a lack of alternative 
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instruments to deal with these causes of displacement.
428
 Both ‘economic migrants’ 
and refugees might engage people smugglers. In addition both may have fraudulent 
or no documentation; although ‘economic migrants’ might destroy their 
documentation to deceive countries of asylum, while refugees might be unable to 
obtain documents from an oppressive government.
429
 The UNHCR has called for 
States to develop more efficient determination procedures to detect fraudulent 
claims. However, this would require States like Australia to allocate further 
resources into refugee determination, further increasing the financial burden of 
processing claims.  
B    The Continuing Need for the Refugee Convention 
Indeed, it is little wonder that States such as Australia have dwindling support for 
their obligations under the Refugee Convention. For Australia, the main difficulties 
are the high financial cost of receiving asylum seekers and the concern that 
‘economic migrants’ are misusing the Refugee Convention. These, in addition to a 
clear preference for sovereignty, are the strongest reasons Australia is reluctant to 
honour its obligations. However, Crock argues that it is not the inadequacies of the 
Refugee Convention that cause these complications. For Crock, the problems can be 
attributed to Australia’s policies.430 Saul echoes this view, stating that the Refugee 
Convention is not hindered by its scope or its interpretation; but by our politics.
431
  
Australia is not unique in its concerns with the Refugee Convention. The financial 
cost of determining claims for protection is also experienced in many other Western 
countries.
432
 Nor is Australia the only State facing the prospect of ‘economic 
migrants’ misusing the Refugee Convention. Many people who may be ‘economic 
migrants’ are drawn to other Western countries for their economic opportunities, 
social welfare arrangements and political stability.
433
 What sets it apart, according to 
Crock, is the extent to which Australia has gone to avoid its obligation to not refoul 
refugees. The duty of non-refoulement is the very foundation of the Refugee 
Convention. Since it has attained the status of jus cogens, no derogation is 
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permitted.
434
 However, it is evident through asylum seeker policies that Australia is 
willing to completely undermine this fundamental duty.  
1    Australia and Non-refoulement 
Under the Refugee Convention, States are prohibited from refouling a refugee in ‘any 
manner whatsoever’.435 The duty not to refoul requires States to ensure that a refugee 
is not sent back to a place they fear persecution. Non-refoulement clearly applies to 
sending asylum seekers to a third country.
436
 Since 2001, Australia has been sending 
asylum seekers to Nauru and PNG for processing.
437
 Australia is required to ensure 
that the asylum seekers transferred will: be treated in accordance with accepted 
international standards, have effective protection against refoulement, and have the 
possibility to seek and enjoy asylum.
438
  
There are no real legislative safeguards for ensuring that an offshore processing 
country will protect asylum seekers from non-refoulement.
439
 Under the current 
legislation, the Minister is permitted to declare an offshore processing country if it is 
considered to be in the national interest to do so.
440
 This is a broad notion with no 
regard for obligations under the Refugee Convention. However, the Minister is 
required to obtain assurances from the third country that (i) asylum seekers who are 
transferred will not be refouled, and (ii) that the country will make an assessments as 
to whether the asylum seekers are refugees under the Refugee Convention.
441
 Despite 
this, section 198AB(4) provides that the assurances do not need to be legally binding. 
Significantly, an offshore processing country does not need to be a party to the 
Refugee Convention or any other human rights treaties.
442
 In practice, these reforms 
have failed to impose any human rights safeguards. It is well known that Nauru and 
PNG both have an inadequate protection framework and for refugees in those places, 
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conditions amount to refoulement.
443 
 However, Australia has retained offshore 
processing as a key element of asylum seeker policy, demonstrating a disregard for 
non-refoulement. 
The obligation of non-refoulement extends to the rejection of asylum seekers at the 
frontiers. This is because all asylum seekers must be treated as if they are refugees 
until a determination is made.
444
 The Australian Government has made concerted 
efforts to prohibit asylum seekers from accessing protection in Australia through 
interdiction and the excision of its territories.
445
  
One of the most alarming barriers Australia has employed is the interdiction of boats 
carrying asylum seekers. That is, physically intercepting boats carrying people 
seeking protection and towing them out of Australia’s territory. The current 
interdiction policy, beginning in September 2013 is dubbed ‘Operation Sovereign 
Borders’.446 It is a co-operative arrangement with Indonesia, which allows for the 
military to intercept boats carrying asylum seekers.
447
 Under this policy, asylum 
seekers can be towed back to Indonesia or taken to Christmas Island.
448
 Either way 
they are prevented from arriving in Australia. The UNHCR has ruled the interdiction 
of boats can constitute non-refoulement.
449
 It has warned that treatment in Indonesia 
may expose an asylum seeker to a threat, due to Indonesia’s inadequate refugee 
determination procedures.
450
 In addition, Indonesia could arbitrarily send the asylum 
seekers to another country where they may be persecuted. ‘Operation Sovereign 
Borders’ is highly likely to violate Australia’s non-refoulement obligations. 
Indonesia is not a signatory to the Refugee Convention and the protective framework 
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for refugees is inadequate.
451
 Any person present in Indonesia without 
documentation is detained in extremely poor conditions and is likely to be 
deported.
452
 The ramifications of this for the 1,106 asylum seekers intercepted since 
September 2013 is not hopeful.
453
   
Yet another example of Australia taking extreme lengths to avoid the duty of non-
refoulement to asylum seekers is the excision of its territory. In 2001 Parliament had 
passed the Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act 2001 (Cth) 
which excised certain areas from Australia’s migration zone.454 This enabled asylum 
seekers who arrived to these ‘offshore excised territories’ to be transferred to an 
offshore processing centre, rather than have their claims heard in Australia. If this 
wasn’t enough, in 2013 Parliament passed legislation upon the recommendation of 
the Houston Report, which excised the whole of Australian mainland from the 
migration zone.
455
 From 16 May 2013, an asylum seeker who arrives by boat 
anywhere in Australian territory is prevented from making a protection claim in 
Australia and will be processed offshore. The UNHCR expressed concerns about 
this, stating that the excision of territory does not discharge Australia of its 
obligations under the Refugee Convention.
456
 Accordingly, the UNHCR held that 
Australia remains responsible for the asylum seekers it transfers.
457
 As discussed 
above, sending asylum seekers to Nauru and PNG has been found to constitute a 
breach of non-refoulement. In addition to non-refoulement, this legislation is 
arguably in violation of the principle of non-discrimination under the Refugee 
Convention, as it creates different treatment for asylum seekers who arrive by boat 
from those who arrive by air.
458
 It could also amount to penalisation, which is 
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prohibited under the Refugee Convention, as the treatment of boat arrivals is less 
favourable than that of air arrivals.  
Indeed, the disregard for the obligation of non-refoulement can be exemplified by the 
Australian Government’s actions in relation to the Tampa Affair. The situation on 
board the MV Tampa was clearly dire, with several passengers unconscious and a 
shortage of food and water. However, the Government, adamant to avoid protection 
obligations, refused to allow the MV Tampa to enter Australian territories and an 
embarrassing three-day standoff ensued. These measures to prevent asylum seekers 
from seeking protection undermine the elements of the Refugee Convention that are 
‘both timeless and universal’.459 It is clear that Australia is willing to go to great 
lengths to prevent vulnerable people from seeking protection, which is far removed 
from the very reason the Refugee Convention was established.  
2    Inconsistency with the Object of the Refugee Convention 
The Refugee Convention was established by the coming together of States at a time 
where they were genuinely horrified at the human rights abuses of WWII.
460
 It was 
developed in a humanitarian spirit, at a time where there was a genuine desire to 
assist and realise basic human rights.
461
 The object of the Refugee Convention is to 
ensure that refugees, and all human beings, ‘shall enjoy fundamental rights and 
freedoms without discrimination’.462 The values the Refugee Convention represents 
are timeless. Goodwin-Gill asserts that it is based on a strong conception of human 
worth and the individual’s entitlement to respect for their dignity and integrity as a 
human being.
463
 The Refugee Convention seeks to emphasise humanity and the 
freedom from fear.  
The fundamental duty, at the very heart of the Refugee Convention, is the obligation 
of non-refoulement. It is a very powerful idea: the notion that no country can turn its 
back on vulnerable victims escaping persecution. The principle of non-refoulement is 
the strongest purpose of the Refugee Convention. Saul asserts that the principle of 
non-refoulement underpinning the Refugee Convention has enduring relevance:  
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The convention's essential principles remain eternally valid, and precious, 
including that governments must not return anyone to persecution. Any 
retreat by Australia from that principle would have catastrophic consequences 
for human safety. It would also signal to other countries that refugee 
protection is no longer an important global value.
464
 
Fitzpatrick provides that non-refoulement is thus the most enduring obligation under 
the Refugee Convention.
465
 It was mandated in light of the reluctance of States to 
protect refugees of WWII. This principle is particularly important for the protection 
of asylum seekers, and Fontaine argues that it is the closest thing that accords to the 
right to seek asylum.
466
 Non-refoulement is so central to refugee protection, that 
commentators who argue that the Refugee Convention should be abandoned submit 
that it is unarguable.
467
  
The principle of non-refoulement is further reinforced by other international treaties, 
under which it is unqualified and absolute. According to Article 3 of the Convention 
Against Torture, States must not expel or return a person to another State if there are 
reasonable grounds for believing that they may be subjected to torture.
468
 The 
Convention on the Rights of the Child also contains a right to be free from torture in 
Article 37, which is mirrored in Article 7 of the ICCPR. Also reinforcing the 
importance of non-refoulement, Article 13 of the ICCPR provides that States cannot 
expel an ‘alien’ lawfully in its territory, without due process. The presence of this 
principle in other international treaties reflects its importance in international human 
rights law.  
Indeed, the principle of non-refoulement is of such importance that it has gained the 
status of jus cogens, that is, a norm of international law.
469
 This demonstrates the 
recognition, on an international level, of the enduring importance of this principle. 
Furthermore, no derogation from this principle is permitted.
470
 As a result, the 
principle of non-refoulement applies globally to all States regardless as to whether a 
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state has acceded to the Refugee Convention.
471
 In this way, some principles of the 
Refugee Convention have the ability to transcend borders and governments.
472
  
Aside from the principle of non-refoulement, other obligations and individual rights 
under the Refugee Convention are of vital importance.
473
 For the protection of 
asylum seekers, the Refugee Convention importantly provides the right to seek 
asylum,
474
 and to do so without being penalised.
475
 It also obliges governments to 
ensure that people can make an application for asylum and have their status 
determined. The Refugee Convention includes the principle of non-discrimination, 
which is well-supported in other international treaties. It also ensures that refugees 
are afforded a range of basic rights such as the right to work and the right to 
education. The Refugee Convention therefore encapsulates an important range of 
fundamental rights. It is the only global instrument of its kind and has been widely 
indorsed and ratified.
476
 The Refugee Convention forms the very foundation of the 
protection of refugees.  
The Refugee Convention cannot be expected to be without flaws, due to its very 
character as an international instrument.
477
 However, some commentators, such as 
Millbank, argue that the Refugee Convention is deeply flawed and should be 
abandoned.
478
 For Millbank, the operation of the Refugee Convention is no longer 
adequate. The author argued that the Refugee Convention ‘causes more harm than 
good’ and suggests:  
It is time that Australia and other signatory countries renounce [the Refugee 
Convention] and committed themselves to a genuinely humanitarian refugee 
policy.
479
 
However, if the Refugee Convention was abandoned, the practical likelihood of it 
being replaced by a more protective instrument is limited. Indeed, many 
commentators are deeply concerned with the outcome if States attempted to replace 
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the Refugee Convention with a ‘genuinely humanitarian’ regime, as Millbank 
suggests. Feller provides that: 
If this instrument is lost, the likelihood of it being replaced by anything 
approaching its value is remote.
480
 
The Refugee Convention is an instrument of compromise.
481
 Under the current 
regime, States are already reluctant to provide protection. In the last few decades the 
scope of the refugee situation has expanded and become more complex.
482
 With 
growing disparity between nations, it is unlikely that an international consensus on 
an alternative regime could be achieved. Even if a consensus could be reached, 
Fontaine provides that if the Refugee Convention were to be replaced, there is no 
guarantee that an alternative would have fewer problems, or be more generous.
483
 
Therefore, many commentators strongly disagree with abandoning the Refugee 
Convention. Dastyari asserts that if we withdraw from the Refugee Convention, we 
are turning our backs on vulnerable people seeking protection, which is undermining 
the very core of the Refugee Convention. To emphasise this, Dastyari argued:  
If Australia was to attempt to water down its obligations under the convention 
or withdraw from it entirely, it would set an embarrassing precedent that will 
be extremely damaging to the international protection regime and leave many 
vulnerable individuals in danger of being left without protection.
484
 
The Refugee Convention is the only instrument that attempts to govern State’s 
responses to asylum seekers and refugees. While the Refugee Convention is flawed, 
if there were no regime of international obligations, the political and administrative 
pressures would undoubtedly weigh even more heavily against refugees.
485
 It is 
therefore essential to maintain a protection mechanism, even if it has only persuasive 
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force. It is fundamental that non-refoulement continues to be the driving principle in 
refugee law.
486
 
 
V    CONCLUSION 
Australia was historically committed to the Refugee Convention, especially with 
respect to resettling refugees from UNHCR camps. Australia had been content with 
accepting those who could be selected on the basis of race, ethnic origin and skills,
487
 
but the response to asylum seekers arriving to its shores has been remarkably 
different. Waves of asylum seeker arrivals have challenged Australia’s commitment 
to the Refugee Convention. The most significant obligation of the Refugee 
Convention is the principle of non-refoulement; that is, not to return a vulnerable 
person to a place where their life or security is threatened. This key obligation is in 
line with the very spirit of the Refugee Convention, to protect individuals who are 
escaping persecution.  
However, since it was established, several issues have emerged, which have caused 
an increasing reluctance of States to provide protection under the Refugee 
Convention.
488
 The Refugee Convention has been criticised on several levels but the 
most significant problems affecting Australia is the high financial cost of 
determining claims and the potential of ‘economic migrants’ to misuse the Refugee 
Convention. As a result, Australia has shown a complete disregard for its protection 
obligations, especially for non-refoulement.  
After the Tampa Affair, the government legislated for all asylum seekers to be taken 
to Nauru or PNG to be processed. The protection framework and conditions in these 
countries are very likely to put Australia in breach of non-refoulement, however this 
has remained a key feature of Australia’s asylum seeker policy. The government 
attempted to strike a similar arrangement with Malaysia, but this was struck down by 
the High Court for essentially breaching Australia’s non-refoulement obligations. 
Australia has also undertaken to directly exclude asylum seekers from reaching its 
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territory, by intercepting and towing back boats, which is highly inconsistent with 
non-refoulement. The human and fiscal costs of these policies are undisputed. With 
the criticisms of the Refugee Convention aside, it is Australia’s willingness to breach 
the most fundamental principle of the Refugee Convention that is the most alarming.  
With little chance of States making any progressive reforms to the Refugee 
Convention, it is paramount to refuge protection that we retain it as the only 
instrument that offers the protection of non-refoulement, otherwise the scales will 
weigh even more heavily against refugees.  
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